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INTRODUCTION
The attorney-client privilege is the "oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications known to the common law."' The privilege is
"[d]eeply rooted in public policy," 2 and plays a 'vital role' in the
administration of justice." 3 As such, the privilege is "traditionally deemed
* Steven Plitt is an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law at the James E. Rogers College of Law,
University of Arizona where he teaches insurance law. He was a former Adjunct Law
Professor at the Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University where he
taught the insurance law curriculum. He is the current successor author to the nationally
acclaimed insurance treatise COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D where he and his team of associate
authors are rewriting and revising the treatise series. He is an author of several insurance law
treatises. He is a nationally recognized expert on insurance law.
Joshua D. Rogers is a Partner at Kunz Plitt Hyland & Demlong. He is an associate
successor author to COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D. He received his J.D., cum laude, from
Pepperdine University School of Law in 2001. Mr. Rogers focuses his practice upon the
litigation of complex insurance coverage cases.
1 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
2 Pampered Chef v. Alexanian, 737 F. Supp. 2d 958, 963 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (citing In re Ford
Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 966 (3d Cir. 1997)).
3 Id. (quoting Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the U.S.,
406 F.3d 867, 878 (7th Cir. 2005)).
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worthy of maximum legal protection"'4 and "it remains one of the most
carefully guarded privileges and is not readily to be whittled down."
The privilege has come under assault in the insurance bad faith context in
recent decades resulting in a "whittling down" of the privilege for insurance
companies as a target party. Over the past couple of decades, various courts
have rendered significant decisions regarding implied waiver of the privilege
in the insurance bad faith context. These courts have seemingly set a
minimal threshold for waiver that is the functional equivalent of a per se
waiver rule, a rule which is inconsistent with the strength of the protection
normally provided the attorney-client privilege in other contexts involving
non-target parties.
In contrast, Arizona, one of the jurisdictions which previously appeared
to create such a per se rule, may be, with recent intermediate court decisions,
redefining the battle for the scope of the attomey-client privilege in the
insurance bad faith context. The Arizona decisions on this issue serve as a
case study regarding the analytic gymnastics courts have engaged in to create
implied waiver in the insurance bad faith context. However, these decisions
may also set the stage for the judicial combatants. Will the battle result in a
return to the more conservative protections of the privilege provided in other
contexts or will it end with a broad per se implied waiver in the insurance
context?
In Part I of this article, the attorney-client privilege is discussed
generally, as well as specifically, in the context of insurer bad faith. In Part
I.A, a general overview of the attorney-client privilege is presented. In Part
I.B, express and implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege are discussed.
The courts have disagreed on the general contours of the test to be applied in
determining whether an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege has
occurred, and what should be the precise formulation for that determination.
The courts have also disagreed as to when a client may be deemed to have
injected privileged attorney-client communications into a case, causing an
implied waiver. There are three general approaches to determine whether a
litigant has impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege. Each of these
approaches is discussed. In Part I.C, the article discusses general principles
regarding insurance bad faith and how the direct assertion of the advice-of-
counsel defense results in waiver of the attorney-client privilege in that
context. The nature and scope of the advice-of-counsel defense is explored.
In Part II, the battle over the changing boundaries of waiver by
implication is examined by comparing the case authority supporting
expansion versus the development of three published decisions from the
courts of Arizona. The discussion starts in Part IIA, where the expansion of
4 BNP Paribas v. Wynne, 967 So. 2d 1065, 1067 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Am.
Tobacco Co. v. State, 697 So. 2d 1249, 1252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
5Id. (citing Swidler & Berlinv. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998)).
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waiver by implication is discussed. Part JJ.B examines a decision from the
Arizona Supreme Court which followed the trend of substantial expansion of
the waiver-by-implication rule and then examines two subsequent decisions
from the Arizona Court of Appeals which have applied the Arizona Supreme
Court precedent to reach two very different and arguably contradictory
results. The first of these appellate decisions arguably takes the expansion of
implied waiver to the next level-a per se rule triggering automatic waiver as
a result of defending a bad faith case on a subjective belief of acting in good
faith. The second appellate decision, however, takes a step back from the
ledge and seeks to limit the prior ruling to its facts rather than creating a per
se rule in those circumstances. Part II.C seeks to synthesize and define the
battle in Arizona over the scope of implied waiver, discussing the chilling
effect continued expansion of implied waiver can have upon the advice that
insurance companies seek from counsel and how the recent decision from
Arizona may serve as a warm front to thaw the chill that has been in the air
for the last two decades.
I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND INSURER BAD FAITH
A. General Overview of the Privilege
The attorney-client privilege protects communications between the
attorney and the client.6 The purpose of the attorney-client privilege "is to
6 Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389. The traditional elements of the attorney-client privilege that
identify communications that may be protected from disclosure and discovery are:
the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to
whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar or a court, or his or
her subordinate, and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a
lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed
(a) by his client, (b) without the presence of strangers, (c) for the purpose of
securing primarily either (i) an opinion of law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance
in some legal proceeding, and (d) not for the purpose of committing a crime or tort;
and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950)). The attorney-client
privilege has been extended to third-party agents of a client or its counsel under certain
circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961). Under
Kovel, "voluntarily disclosing the information contained in the [privileged] documents to
nonparties waives the attorney-client privilege, unless such disclosure was 'necessary, or at
least highly useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer which the
privilege is designed to permit."' Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 199 F.R.D. 515, 522 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (quoting Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922). Based on these principles, courts following Kovel
have applied a two-step analysis in evaluating whether the attorney-client privilege should be
2015 107
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encourage full and frank communication between attomeys and their
clients." 7  Whether the attomey-client privilege attaches depends on the
nature of the communication.
There are two broad justifications which underlie the privilege. The first
justification is that the privilege promotes disclosure of all relevant
information by the client to enable the attorney to effectively represent the
client or to give adequate legal advice. 9 Without the privilege, it is presumed
that many clients would not communicate all relevant information to the
attorney if adverse parties could use it against them in subsequent litigation.
The second justification is that an attorney must be able to openly
extended to third-party agents. This analysis focuses upon: (1) Whether the inclusion of the
third-party agent in the otherwise privileged communications occurs under circumstances
reflecting the parties' reasonable expectation that the confidentiality of the communications
will be maintained, and (2) whether disclosure of the otherwise privileged communications to
the third-party agent is necessary in order for the client to obtain appropriately informed legal
advice. See generally United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1999); Constr.
Indus. Servs. Corp. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 206 F.R.D. 43, 47-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Pfohl
Bros. Landfill Litig., 175 F.R.D. 13, 23-24 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); People v. Osorio, 549 N.E.2d
1183, 1185-86 (N.Y. 1989); Doe v. Poe, 664 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122 (1997). In extending the
scope of the privilege, implicitly or explicitly, the courts have found that the disclosure of the
otherwise privileged communications to the third-party agent to be "necessary" to the client's
ability to seek and receive effective legal advice from counsel, are found that the third-party
agent was essentially fulfilling a role functionally equivalent to that of an integral employee of
the client. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141, 147-48 (D.C.
Cir. 2002); In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 937-38 (8th Cir. 1994); In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust
Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213, 215, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Upjohn, 499 U.S. at 389.
8 The nature of the communication must be examined. Where the attorney is hired to perform
claims adjusting or to act in a capacity other than as a lawyer, the communications may not be
privileged. Mission Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Lilly, 112 F.R.D. 160, 163 (D. Minn. 1986) (holding that
ordinary business of a party is outside the scope of attorney-client privilege); Hercules, Inc. v.
Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 147 (D. Del. 1977) (stating that advice of counsel rendered on
non-legal matters is not within scope of attorney-client privilege); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Superior Court, 200 Cal. Rptr. 471, 476 (1984). Some courts look to the "dominant purpose"
of the communication to determine whether the attorney-client privilege exists for
communications between the insurance company and the attorney. See, e.g., Travelers Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. Rptr. 871 (1983). The dominant purpose of the transaction
must be to transmit information in the course of the attorney's professional employment. Id.
at 879. In Lanasa v. State, 71 A. 1058, 1064 (Md. 1909), the test utilized for "legal advice"
was whether the communications relate to professional advice and to the subject matter about
which such advice is sought. "The relevant question is not whether [the attorney] was retained
to conduct an investigation ... but rather, whether this investigation was 'related to the
rendition of legal services."' In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 604 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (holding that a determination of whether the investigation is privileged will
focus on whether the issues are routine or whether they are complex issues of law, which
intrinsically require sophisticated legal appraisals). Therefore, the parties must intend the
communication to be confidential. In re Underwriters at Lloyd's, 666 F.2d 55, 57 (4th Cir.
1981).
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
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communicate legal advice and strategies to the client in order to adequately
represent him or her, and that the attorney would not engage in such
communications if adverse litigants could discover them in subsequent
litigation.' 0 Because "sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends,""
the privilege is necessary to promote full and unrestricted communication
within the attorney-client relationship.
10 Id.
1 Id. Despite the beneficial nature of the attorney-client privilege, some courts have adopted a
strict interpretation to limit its scope. See, e.g., Cameron v. Gen. Motors Corp., 158 F.R.D.
581, 586 (D.S.C. 1994), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. In re Gen. Motors Corp.,
Case No. 94-2435, 1995 WL 940063 (4th Cir. Feb. 17, 1995). In Cameron, a non-insurance
case, the district court recognized the limited nature of the attorney-client privilege and the
strict construction and limitations governing its application: "Because the attorney-client
privilege is an exception from the otherwise liberal construction of discovery rules, its use is
not favored by federal courts. Therefore, assertions of attorney-client privilege are 'to be
strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its
principal."' Cameron, 158 F.R.D. at 586 (internal quotations omitted); see also NLRB v.
Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 906 (4th Cir. 1965); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224,
1235 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1441 (4th Cir. 1986); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal, 947 F.2d 1188, 1190 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he [attorney-
client] privilege must be strictly construed.").
Evidentiary privileges are an exception to the general rule that relevant evidence is
admissible. Privileges forbid the admission of otherwise relevant evidence when certain
interests the privileges are thought to protect are regarded as more important than the interests
served by the resolution of litigation based on full disclosure of all relevant facts. However,
the privilege forbidding the discovery of admission of evidence relating to communications
between attorney and client is intended to insure that a client remains free from apprehension
that consultations with a legal advisor will be disclosed. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464,
470 (1888). The attorney-client privilege encourages the client to reveal to the lawyer
confidences necessary for the lawyer to provide advice and representation. See E. W.
CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 314 (3d ed. 1984). Because the privilege serves
the interests of justice, courts have observed that it is worthy of maximum protection. Haines
v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1992). Courts and commentators have
supported the privilege:
As long as our society recognizes that advice as to matters relating to the law should
be given by persons trained in the law that is, by lawyers anything that materially
interferes with that relationship must be restricted or eliminated, and anything that
fosters the success of that relationship must be retained and strengthened. The
relationship and the continued existence of the giving of legal advice by persons
accurately and effectively trained in the law is of greater societal value, it is
submitted, than the admissibility of a given piece of evidence in a particular lawsuit.
Contrary to the implied assertions of the evidence authorities, the heavens will not
fall if all relevant and competent evidence cannot be admitted.
State ex rel. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Mo. 1978) (quoting
Robert Allen Sedler & Joseph J. Simeone, Privileges in the Law of Evidence: The Realities of
Attorney-Client Confidences, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 3 (1963)).
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Courts must work to apply the privilege in ways that are predictable and
certain in order to serve the interests of justice by encouraging consultation
with counsel free from the apprehension of disclosure. "An uncertain
privilege-or one which purports to be certain, but results in widely varying
applications by the courts-is little better than no privilege."' 2  Thus,
uncertainty regarding the scope of the attorney-client privilege may have an
adverse impact. If uncertainty remains, attorneys and their clients will be
forced to assume that private communications will be subject to discovery,
essentially eliminating the privilege.' 3
B. Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege Generally
Express waivers of the attorney-client privilege are easy to identify and
are therefore not discussed herein. Whether an implied waiver has occurred,
however, is a vexing issue. Courts disagree about the general contours of the
test to be applied to determine whether an implied waiver of the attorney-
client privilege has occurred. Courts also dispute at what point a client may
be deemed to have injected privileged communications with his or her
attorney into the case, thus causing an implied waiver. There are three
general approaches courts have used to determine whether the attorney-client
privilege has been impliedly waived by a litigant: 4 (1) the Automatic Waiver
Rule; (2) the Intermediate Test; and (3) the Restrictive Test.
Under the automatic waiver rule, the attorney-client privilege is waived
upon an assertion of a civil claim or an affirmative defense "that raises as an
issue a matter to which otherwise privileged material is present."" The
12 In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1987).
13 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 13 P.3d 1169, 1187 (Ariz. 2000) (McGregor, J.,
dissenting).
14 Frontier Ref., Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 699-700 (10th Cir. 1998). The court
in Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States observed:
The first of these general approaches is the "automatic waiver" rule, which
provides that a litigant automatically waives the privilege upon assertion of a
claim, counter-claim, or affirmative defense that raises as an issue a matter to
which otherwise privileged material is relevant.... The second set of generalized
approaches provides that the privilege is waived only when the material to be
discovered is both relevant to the issues raised in the case and either vital or
necessary to the opposing party's defense of the case . . . . Finally, several courts
have recently concluded that a litigant waives the attorney-client privilege if, and
only if, the litigant directly puts the attorney's advice at issue in the litigation
764 F.2d 1577, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
15 See Indep. Prods. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 276-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)
(originating "automatic waiver" rule); see also Lyons v. Johnson, 415 F.2d 540, 542 (9th Cir.
1969), (discussing Independent Products and automatic waiver rule); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.
v. Wise, 139 F.R.D. 168, 170-71 (D. Colo. 1991) (same). The automatic waiver rule is
typically used when directed at a plaintiff who initiates civil litigation. "As a voluntary
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automatic waiver rule does not apply to defendants who have not initiated the
lawsuit. 6 However, this same consideration exists where a civil defendant
raises an affirmative defense that is enmeshed in important evidence that will
be unavailable to plaintiff if privilege prevails. This typically happens in the
context when the insurance company raises the advice of counsel defense.' 7
The "automatic waiver" rule has been criticized because it minimizes the
importance of the attorney-client privilege to the adversarial system.' 8
The intermediate approach balances the need for discovery with the
importance of maintaining the attorney-client privilege.19  "Under this
approach the privilege is waived only when the material to be discovered is
both relevant to the issues raised in the case and either vital or necessary to
the opposing party's defense of the case."20 In Hearn v. Rhay,2 ' the court
applied this approach. The court in Hearn analyzed various exceptions to the
rules of privilege 22 and distilled the factors common to recognized implied
litigant, the civil plaintiff has created the situation which requires him to choose between his
silence and his lawsuit." Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1089 n.10 (5th
Cir. 1979). Typically, a civil plaintiff "voluntarily" brings litigation only because there is no
other effective means of protecting legal rights. See Marjorie S. White, Note, Plaintiff as
Deponent: Invoking the Fifth Amendment, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 158, 162 (1981) (challenging the
voluntary-involuntary distinction); J.K. Richards, Note, Toward a Rational Treatment of
Plaintiffs Who Invoke the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination During Discovery, 66 IOWA L.
REV. 575, 594-601 (1981). Where the plaintiff has initiated the action and forced a defendant
into court, the plaintiff cannot use privilege as both a sword and a shield. In Lyons, the court
observed:
The scales of justice would hardly remain equal in these respects, if a party can
assert a claim against another and then be able to block all discovery attempts
against him by asserting [the attorney-client] privilege to any interrogation
whatsoever upon his claim. If any prejudice is to come from such a situation, it
must, as a matter of basic fairness in the purposes and concepts on which the right of
litigation rests, be to the party asserting the claim and not to the one who has been
subjected to its assertion. It is the former who has made the election to create an
imbalance in the pans of the scales.
Lyons, 415 F.2d at 542.
16 Indep. Prods. Corp., 22 F.R.D. at 27677.
17 See discussion infra Part I.C.
18 See Greater Newburyport Clamshell Alliance v. Pub. Serv. Co., 838 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir.
1988) (criticizing "automatic waiver" rule); Afro-Lecon, Inc. v. United States, 820 F.2d 1198,
1205 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (same).
19 See Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1266-69 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (balancing need
for discovery with importance of privilege), vacatedwithout opinion, 458 U.S. 1118 (1982).
20 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
21 68 F.R.D. 574, 581-82 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
22 Id at 580-82. Principally, the court reviewed the physician-patient privilege which is
waived by a plaintiff-patient "by filing a [law]suit that places patient's physical condition in
controversy"; and the attorney-client privilege which is impliedly waived "where the attorney
and client are themselves adverse parties in [litigation] arising out of the relationship." Id. at
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waiver situations: (1) assertion of the privilege was a result of some
affirmative act, such as filing suit, by the asserting party; (2) through this
affirmative act, the asserting party put the protected information at issue by
making it relevant to the case; and (3) application of the privilege would have
denied the opposing party access to information vital to his defense.
The Hearn court instructed that when these three conditions are present,
a court should find that the party asserting a privilege has impliedly waived
it through his own affirmative conduct." 23 A court should begin this analysis
with a presumption in favor of preserving the privilege. 2 4
580. The court also noted that in patent infringement lawsuits, a privilege waiver may occur
"where a plaintiff put[s] the validity of the patent at issue." See Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117, 118 (M.D. Pa. 1970). In Hearn, the court found persuasive an
analogy to "cases holding that a habeas corpus petitioner impliedly waives the attorney-client
privilege by contesting the constitutionality of his state court conviction." Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at
581. In the latter situation, other courts have permitted inquiry into the attorney-client
relationship to determine whether a "deliberate bypass" of the right alleged to have been
violated occurred. See, e.g., Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326, 327 (5th Cir. 1967);
Henderson v. Heinze, 349 F.2d 67, 70-71 (9th Cir. 1965). A defendant may also waive the
privilege by asserting advice of counsel as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Hunt v.
Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (holding that allegation that party was misled by counsel
resulted in waiver); Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that privilege was waived when party claimed that its tax position was reasonable
because it was based on advice of counsel). A common denominator in these situations was
that "the party asserting the privilege placed information protected by [the attorney-client
privilege] in issue through some affirmative act for his own benefit, and to allow the privilege
to protect against disclosure of such information would have been manifestly unfair to the
opposing party." Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 581.
23 Id Significantly, the third prong of the Hearn test places the burden on the party seeking
discovery to show that the information is relevant and material to the claim or defense. 68
F.R.D. at 582; see also 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 26.60[6], at 26-218, 219 (1986). The
burden is proportionate to the danger posed by the discovery to the type of privilege being
asserted. Where a constitutional privilege is involved, for example, the First Amendment
associational privilege, a heavy burden for disclosure exists primarily because of the
"preferred position of First Amendment rights" in civil cases. Black Panther Party v. Smith,
661 F.2d 1243, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1981), judgment vacated without opinion sub nom. Moore v.
Black Panther Party, 458 U.S. 1118 (1982); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 764
F.2d 1577, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (rejecting the automatic waiver rule to protect non-
constitutional privileges). The Sixth Amendment provides a shield for the attorney-client
privilege only in criminal proceedings. Upon the termination of these proceedings and
initiation of a civil action putting the privilege at issue, that constitutional protection ends.
The liberal federal policy favoring discovery is of substantially greater relative weight where
the party invokes the privilege in a civil rather than a criminal case. Indep. Prods. Corp. v.
Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 278-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). One court has held that disclosure of
information vital to a party's case should be compelled "only after the litigant has shown that
he has exhausted every reasonable source of information." Black Panther Party, 661 F.2d at
1268. Furthermore, the party "must describe the information they hope to obtain and its
importance to their case with a reasonable degree of specificity." Id.
24 However, under the Hearn test, in civil actions, fairness may require that the privilege
holder surrender the privilege in so far as it will weaken, in a meaningful way, the opposing
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The majority of jurisdictions follow the Hearn test. 25 The test is not
without its critics, however. A significant minority of courts criticize the
Hearn test because it focuses excessively on the asserted relevancy of the
privileged communications while ignoring the reason why the privilege is
recognized in the first place. 26  An example of this criticism is found in
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co. 27 The court in Rhone-
Poulenc observed that while the Hearn court "dress[ed] up [its] analysis with
a check list of factors, [it] appear[s] to rest on a conclusion that the
information sought is relevant and should in fairness be disclosed." 28
Focusing on the important justifications behind the attorney-client privilege,
the Rhone-Poulenc court expressed the criticism that the relationship
between a client and his or her attorney will suffer because of the uncertainty
regarding whether communications will remain confidential, leading to a
greater risk that important confidential matters could require disclosure
without any real predictability. "[B]ecause the definition of what may be
relevant and discoverable from those consultations may depend on the facts
and circumstances of as yet unfiled litigation, the client will have no sense of
whether the communication may be relevant to some future issue, and will
have no sense of certainty or assurance that the communication will remain
confidential." 2 9
The court in Rhone-Poulenc found that the advice of counsel was not
placed in issue merely because it was relevant and that the advice given did
not necessarily become an issue merely because the attorney's advice might
party's ability to defend. The privilege will give way where a party seeking to pierce the
privilege can establish that the claim, and probable defenses thereto, are enmeshed in
important, vital evidence that will be otherwise unavailable if the privilege prevails.
25 Frontier Ref., Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 699-700 (10th Cir. 1998); Home
Indem. Co. v. Lane Powell Moss & Miller, 43 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1995); Pyramid
Controls, Inc. v. Siemens Indus. Automations, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 269, 272 (N.D. Ill. 1997)
(describing Hearn as "the seminal case on 'at issue' waiver").
26 See Harter v. Univ. of Indianapolis, 5 F. Supp. 2d 657, 664-65 & n.2 (S.D. Ind. 1998)
(stating that "better-reasoned cases" hold that the act of filing a lawsuit where state of mind
may be relevant does not waive privilege unless client specifically relies on advice of counsel;
a contrary rule "effectively discourages a client from seeking legal advice by removing the
assurance of confidentiality"); Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. Rptr.
825, 828-29 (1987) (stating that "[p]rivileged communications do not become discoverable
simply because they are related to issues in the litigation" and upholding privilege even though
insurer's general state of mind was at issue in bad faith claim where insurer stipulated that it
would not rely on advice of counsel defense). Other courts are more protective of the
privilege and will not find waiver unless the client directly relies on advice of counsel. See,
e.g., Aranson v. Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1030 (N.H. 1995) (holding that there is no waiver
unless "the privilege holder injects the privileged material itself into the case").
27 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994) (criticizing Hearn as of dubious validity).
28 Id. at 864.
29 id
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affect the client's state of mind in a relevant matter.3 0 The advice of counsel
was only placed in issue where the client asserted a claim or defense, and
attempted to prove that claim or defense by disclosing or describing an
attorney-client communication.3 1
Under the restrictive approach, a litigant waives the attorney-client
privilege if, and only if, the litigant directly puts the attorney's advice at issue
in the litigation.32 For example, when a client files a malpractice action
against his or her attorney, he or she may waive the privilege as to particular
communications. 3 3 By placing the attorney's advice at issue, the client is
waiving the privilege by requiring an examination of the facts and issues
relating to that advice.34 This may occur when the insurance company raises
the advice of counsel defense to a bad faith lawsuit.
C. Waiver Through Direct Assertion Of The Advice-Of-Counsel Defense In
Bad Faith Cases
1. A Brief Introduction to Bad Faith
As a concept, bad faith, like negligence, must be considered in a specific
context because it has no definite independent meaning.35 It is often
30 Id. at 863.
31 Id.; see also Pittston Co. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 143 F.R.D. 66, 71 (D.N.J. 1992); N. River Ins.
Co. v. Phila. Reinsurance Corp., 797 F. Supp. 363, 370 (D.N.J. 1992).
32 Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 86364 (adopting restrictive test and criticizing more liberal
views of waiver; purpose of privilege still applies when "state of mind" is at issue and single-
minded focus on relevance "completely undermines the interest to be served"; no waiver
where plaintiffs had not "injected the advice of counsel as an essential element of a claim");
see also Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Lyons, 10 P.3d 166, 173 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting
the Hearn approach and adopting the Rhone-Poulenc test that there must be "an offensive or
direct use of privileged information" before the attorney client privilege will be deemed to
have been waived).
33 Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 863.
34 Id. at 865.
35 See James C. Nielsen, Advice of Counsel in Insurance Bad Faith Litigation: A Substantive
Framework for Pleading, Discovery and Proof 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 533, 534-35 (1990).
Commentators have offered varying views of how many standards of bad faith exist. For an
analysis of how commentators have offered various opinions on the standard to determine bad
faith. See Lane Christine Boyarski, The Best Place, Inc. v. Penn America Insurance
Company.: Hawai'i Bad Faith Cause ofAction for Insurer Misconduct, 19 U. HAW. L. REv.
845, 853-54 (1997); see also Steven Plitt & Jordan R. Plitt, 1 PRACTICAL TOOLS FOR
HANDLING INSURANCE CASES §§ 7:2-7:5 (Thomson Reuters 2011) (the authors discuss each
state bad faith standard). For a description of the creation of the tort of insurance company
bad faith, see Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance
Transactions: Refining the Standard of Culpability and Reformulating the Remedies by
Statute, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 22-26 (1992).
The court in Wallbrook Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., made the
following insightful observation:
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illustrated in a negative fashion by explaining what it is not. The tort of bad
faith in Arizona has been described as a hybrid cause of action, sharing
elements of both a negligence action and an intentional tort.36 The tort is
composed of two essential elements. The first element-whether the
insurance company acted reasonably toward its insured-is based upon a
simple, objective negligence standard.3 7 The second element-whether the
Insurers are required to act with good faith in dealings with their insureds. The
courts of this state recognize that the concept of good faith possesses "an intangible
and abstract quality with no technical meaning." One commentator sees the idea of
good faith as having "no definite meaning of its own," but is commonly illustrated
in a negative fashion, "by explaining what it is not." Coming to the same
conclusion, another observer notes that good faith "is a phrase which has no general
meaning or meanings of its own, but which serves to exclude many heterogeneous
forms of bad faith . . . in a particular context the phrase takes on specific meaning,
but usually this is only by way of contrast with the specific form of bad faith
actually or hypothetically ruled out." Looking to define bad faith is hardly less
frustrating, for it too is recognized as an "amorphous concept" which "necessarily
varies with the context" and thus has "no generally accepted 'correct' definition."
As may be gathered, the issue of whether good faith was exercised covers a broad
range of territory. . . . [D]ecisions of the Court of Appeals have established that the
litmus of good faith/bad faith is to be tested against the background of the totality of
the circumstances in which the insurer's disputed actions occurred.
7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 518 (Ct. App. 1992). See Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed
Standards for Evaluating When the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been
Violated: A Framework for Resolving the Mystery, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 585, 585-86 (1996).
36 Trus Joist Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 735 P.2d 125, 134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
37 Steven Plitt, ARIZONA LIABILITY INSURANCE LAW§ 5.1 (State Bar of Arizona 1998). The
concept of bad faith requires more than negligence to support judgment by the insurance
company. Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 576 (Ariz. 1986); Centennial Ins. Co. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 404 N.E.2d 759, 762 (Ohio 1980). "It imports a dishonest purpose,
moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive
or ill will partaking of the nature of fraud." Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315,
1320 (Ohio 1983). The requirement of more than mere negligence is supported by the
holdings in many published decisions. See, e.g., Gen. Star Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 960 F.2d 377, 380 (3rd Cir. 1992) (interpreting New York law); White v. Cont'l Gen. Ins.
Co., 831 F. Supp. 1545, 1555 (D. Wyo. 1993); Turner Constr. Co. v. First Indem. of Am. Ins.
Co., 829 F. Supp. 752, 762-64 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Matt v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 798 F. Supp.
429, 434 (W.D. Ky. 1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1992) (interpreting Kentucky law);
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Citizensbank of Thomasville, 491 So. 2d 880, 882 (Ala. 1986); First
Marine Ins. Co. v. Booth, 876 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Ark. 1994); Dolan v. Aid Ins. Co., 431
N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1988); Wittmer v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 885, 890-92 (Ky. 1993);
Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Veasley, 610 So. 2d 290, 295 (Miss. 1992); Ganaway v. Shelter
Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); see also Mission Ins. Co. v. Aetna
Life & Cas. Co., 687 F. Supp. 249, 253 (E.D. La. 1988) (requiring "something more than mere
error of judgment" to show insurer bad faith). However, a minority of states apply a
negligence standard. See, e.g., Mock v. Mich. Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 607
(Ct. App. 1992); Ind. Ins. Co. v. Plummer Power Mower & Tool Rental, Inc., 590 N.E.2d
1085, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 628 N.E.2d 14, 17
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insurance company acted knowingly 38-is a subjective determination. The
introduction of this second element of knowledge is what elevates the cause
of action to a quasi-intentional tort.
The first, negligence-based element of the tort acts as a threshold test for
bad faith actions.39 "Where the insurer acts reasonably, there can be no bad
faith."40
Where an insurance company intentionally denies, fails to process, or
refuses to pay a claim without a reasonable basis for such action, the tort of
(Mass. 1994); Gelinas v. Metro. Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 551 A.2d 962, 966 (N.H. 1988);
Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766, 776 (W. Va. 1990).
38 It is the unreasonableness of the insurance company's conduct that is the essence of the tort.
See Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 433 (Ct. App. 1994); Chester v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 534, 537 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990); Alsobrook v. Nat'l Travelers Life
Ins. Co., 852 P.2d 768, 770 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992). The focus is upon the actual knowledge of
the insurance company that its conduct was unreasonable or whether the company should have
known that it was acting unreasonably. See, e.g., Galusha v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 844 F. Supp.
1401, 1404 (D. Colo. 1994); Turner v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Cos., 614 So. 2d 1029, 1032
(Ala. 1993); Ness v. W. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 122, 125 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Brown v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 513 N.W.2d 762, 763 (Iowa 1994); Weatherly v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield Ins. Co., 513 N.W.2d 347, 354 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879
S.W.2d 10, 18 (Tex. 1994), superseded by statute, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
41.001(11), as recognized in U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118 (Tex. 2012).
39 Trus Joist, 735 P.2d at 134.
40 Id The court in Trus Joist Corp. v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America gave an excellent
exposition of this concept:
[D]id the insurance company act in a manner consistent with the way a reasonable
insurer would be expected to act under the circumstances. This is the threshold test
for all bad faith actions, whether first or third party. Where an insurer acts
reasonably, there can be no bad faith. However, the converse of this proposition is
not necessarily true: merely because an insurer acts unreasonably does not mean that
it is guilty of bad faith. Negligent conduct which results solely from honest mistake,
oversight or carelessness does not necessarily create bad faith liability even though it
may be objectively unreasonable [citation omitted]. Some form of consciously
unreasonable conduct is required.
Id. at 134. Thus, mere negligence or inadvertence is insufficient to establish the cause of
action. Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 576 (Ariz. 1986). The court in Apodaca
observed:
Insurance companies, like other enterprises and all human beings, are far from
perfect. Papers get lost, telephone messages misplaced and claims ignored because
paper-work was misfiled or improperly processed. Such isolated mischances may
result in a claim being unpaid or delayed. None of these mistakes will ordinarily
constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, even
though the company may render itself liable for at least nominal damages for breach
of contract in failing to pay the claim.
Id. at 573.
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bad faith may arise.' Insurance companies are permitted, however, to
challenge claims that are "fairly debatable" 42 or where a genuine dispute
41 Noble v. Nat'l Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866, 867 (Ariz. 1981); Anderson v. Cont'l Ins.
Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978). The Arizona Supreme Court in Zilisch v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., found that an insurance company may be liable for bad
faith if its general claims handling practices are done in bad faith. 995 P.2d 276 (Ariz. 2000).
The court in Zilisch held that certain practices of State Farm, including setting arbitrary goals
for the reduction of claims paid and paying salaries and bonuses based on the amount paid out
in claims, coupled with specific actions taken in plaintiff's case were sufficient to create a
question for the jury regarding whether the company acted in bad faith. Id. at 280. Notably,
in the Zilisch case, ten months after the initial demand to pay the claim, State Farm continued
to decline to pay even though it had four doctors' reports supporting payment. Id. Further,
after reviewing a fifth doctor's report, State Farm took four more months to pay and, during
the additional four months, State Farm made several low offers to try to settle the claim. Id.
42 Jordan v. Union Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (D.S.D. 1991) (stating that insurer is
entitled to challenge fairly debatable claims); Ward v. Firemann Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1031,
1033 (D.S.D. 1991), overruled by Transamerica Fin. Corp. v. Superior Court, 761 P.2d 1019
(Ariz. 1988); Dirks v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 857, 861 (Iowa 1991).
Numerous courts have articulated a "fairly debatable" standard in insurance bad faith cases.
See, e.g., Davis v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 604 So. 2d 354, 358 (Ala. 1982); Deese v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 838 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Ariz. 1992); Garnett v. Transamerica Ins.
Servs., 800 P.2d 656, 666 (Idaho 1990); Nassen v. Nat'l State Ins. Co., 494 N.W.2d 231, 236
(Iowa 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1031 (1993); Pickett v. Lloyd's, 621 A.2d 445, 453 (N.J.
1993); Tokles & Son, Inc. v. Midwestern Indem. Co., 605 N.E.2d 936, 943 (Ohio 1992);
Bartlett v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 538 A.2d 997, 1000 (R.I. 1988); In re
Certification of Question of Law from the U.S. Dist. Court, 399 N.W.2d 320, 324 (S.D. 1987);
Newhouse v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Wis. 1993); First Wyo. Bank,
N.A. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 1094, 1101 (Wyo. 1993).
In Zilisch v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 995 P.2d 276 (Ariz. 2000), the Arizona
Supreme Court vacated the Arizona Court of Appeals' decision-977 P.2d 134 (Ariz. Ct.
Appl. 1998)-where the Court of Appeals held that as long as the amount the insurance
company ultimately offers to its insured on an underinsured motorist claim is fairly debatable,
"poor practice and bad motives [in the investigation process] do not enter into the inquiry [of
whether bad faith has taken place]." 977 P.2d at 139. In rejecting the Court of Appeals
analysis, the Arizona Supreme Court found that "fair debatability" as a "threshold question"
was not outcome determinative of the bad faith inquiry. Recognizing that insurance
companies may defend fairly debatable claims, the court found that an insurance company
must exercise reasonable care and good faith when defending a fairly debatable claim. Zilisch,
995 P.2d at 279. The court further found that while fair debatability is a necessary condition
to avoid a claim of bad faith, it was not always a sufficient condition to avoid bad faith. The
appropriate inquiry was whether there was sufficient evidence from which reasonable jurors
could conclude that in the investigation, evaluation, and processing of the claim, the insurer
acted unreasonably and either knew or was conscious of the fact that its conduct was
unreasonable. Id. at 279-80.
Courts have differed in defining and interpreting "fair debatability." As an example, the
Alabama Supreme Court in National Savings Life Insurance Co. v. Dutton found that where
there is a genuine issue of law with respect to the insurance company's denial of a claim,
which precluded a directed verdict for the insured, the insurance company was entitled to a
directed verdict on the issue of bad faith. 419 So. 2d 1357 (Ala. 1982). However, the Dutton
rule, which gave rise to the so-called directed verdict test of bad faith, has been rejected by
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exists under the genuine dispute doctrine. 43 In determining "fair debatability,
an examination of the circumstances surrounding the claim presentation
other courts. See, e.g., Bildenv. United Equitable Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 822, 829 (8th Cir. 1990)
(interpreting North Dakota Law); Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 703, 711-
12 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 723 P.2d 675 (Ariz. 1986).
43 As with the fair debatability doctrine, the genuine dispute doctrine applies to both factual
and legal disputes. Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Assn. v. Associated Internet Ins. Co.,
108 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 776, 785 (Ct. App. 2001); Fontaine v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10 Fed.
App'x. 415, 418 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Leo John Jordan & Jennifer K. Kenchel, Recent
Developments in Property Insurance Law, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 675, 698-700 (2002); Douglas
G. Houser, Ronald J. Clark & Linda M. Bolduan, Good Faith as a Matter ofLaw An Update
on the Insurance Company's "Right to be Wrong," 39 TORT & INS. L.J. 1045, 1065 (2004).
However, whether the doctrine applies in cases with factual disputes should be decided on a
case-by-case basis. Chateau Chamberay, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785; Guebara v. Allstate Ins.
Co, 237 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Houser, supra, at 1065. Notwithstanding this
general rule, state and federal courts have identified various ways in which an insurer may
demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute. One way is for an insurer to show that "it
relied on opinions from experts while evaluating the insured's claim." Keshish v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 959 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1233 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting Maynard v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 499 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1160 (C.D. Cal. 2007)); Chateau Chamberay, 108 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 785. "[A] single, thorough report by an independent expert is sufficient, all other things
being equal, to support application of the 'genuine dispute' doctrine." Keshish, 959 F. Supp.
2d at 1236 (quoting Adams v. Allstate Ins. Co., 187 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1215 (C.D. Cal. 2002))
(genuine dispute existed where insurer relied on independent contractor's estimate for smoke
damage remediation in determining the amount owing under policy); see also Leo John
Jordan, Recent Developments in Property Insurance Law, 38 TORT & INS. L.J. 657, 684
(2003).
Insurers can also demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute in cases where "an
arbitrator awards substantially lower damages than Plaintiff claims." Keshish, 959 F. Supp. 2d
at 1236 (citing Maynard, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 1160); see also Chateau Chamberay, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 776 (affirming summary judgment in favor of insurer on bad faith claim; insurer had
reasonable and legitimate basis for questioning the claim, as demonstrated by the evidence
presented and by the fact that an arbitrator found only 45% of the plaintiff's claim was
covered).
A genuine dispute may also exist where liability is uncertain based on controlling case
law. Opsal v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 357 (Ct. App. 1991);
Dalrymple v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 857 (Ct. App. 1995); see also
Franceschi v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 852 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1988) (genuine issue as to
coverage where term "medical treatment" as used in policy was ambiguous); LG Infocomm
U.S.A. v. Euler Am. Credit Indem. Co., 419 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (the term
"allowed" as used policy exclusion was ambiguous and insured had case law supporting its
interpretation; genuine dispute doctrine applied to defeat insured's bad faith claim).
An insurer must have conducted a full, fair and thorough investigation to rely on the
genuine dispute doctrine. Bosetti v. U.S. Life Ins. Co. in City of N.Y., 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 744,
767 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Chateau Chamberay, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785); see also Gentry v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 726 F. Supp. 2d at 1160, 1166-67 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (the
genuine dispute rule "does not relieve an insurer from its obligation to thoroughly and fairly
investigate, process and evaluate the insured's claim."); Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 171
P.3d 1082, 1086-88 (Cal. 2007).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, "a 'thorough' investigation is not necessarily a perfect
investigation; and the mere fact that in hindsight there may be other areas that could have been
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should be made. 4 A claim is typically "fairly debatable" where there remain
unanswered material questions involving law or fact that provide an
explanation for the insurance company's delay or refusal to pay a claim.
The presence of a legitimate coverage defense to a claim submission may
preclude bad faith.46  Claims may be denied on the basis of a "fairly
investigated does not always establish bad faith." Fontaine v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10
Fed. App'x 415, 418 (quoting Hon. H. Walter Croskey, et al., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE:
INSURANCE LITIGATION § 12:866 (Rutter Group 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To
constitute bad faith, a failure to investigate "must rise to the level of unfair dealing." Harbison
v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1041 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Shade
Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Prods. Sales & Mktg., Inc., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 364, 386 (Ct. App.
2000)). "An unreasonable failure to investigate amounting to such unfair dealing may be
found when an insurer fails to consider, or seek to discover, evidence relevant to the issues of
liability and damages." Id.
44 Forcucciv. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 11 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1993).
Courts have differed regarding the point in time that becomes relevant for purposes of
assessing whether the insurance company had reasonable grounds for denying the claim. A
significant number of courts have stated that they will only consider evidence available to the
insurance company at the time of the denial. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So.
2d 1050, 1053 (Ala. 1987). However, some courts inquire as to whether the insurance
company had a fairly debatable reason for denying the claim based on the facts presented at
trial. See, e.g., Mass. Bay Ins. Co. v. Hall, 395 S.E.2d 851, 857 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990). One
commentator has opined that insurance companies should not be permitted to meet the
standards by putting forth grounds recognized after the denial of a claim. See Chris M.
Kallianos, Survey, Bad Faith Refusal to Pay First-Party Insurance Claims: A Growing
Recognition ofExtra-Contract Damages, 64 N.C. L. REv. 1421, 1435 (1986).
45 See Larson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 263, 266 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (stating that
questions of law and fact can make a claim fairly debatable); S & W Prop., Inc. v. Am.
Motorists Ins. Co., 668 So.2d 529, 532 (Ala. 1995) (plaintiff must establish insurance
company had no factual or legal defense to the claim); Morgan v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,
534 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Iowa 1995), overruled by Hamm v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 612 N.W.2d 775
(Iowa 2000) (a claim may be fairly debatable as to a matter of fact or law); Larsen, 857 P.2d at
266 (fairly debatable claims may concern matters of fact or law). A few courts have found
that whether a claim is fairly or reasonable debatable is a question of law. See AMCO Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Lamphere, 541 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995); Billings v. Union Bankers
Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996); Bushey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 670 A.2d 807, 810 (Vt.
1995). However, other courts have found that the determination as to whether a claim is fairly
or reasonably debatable is a question of fact for the jury. Watts v. Westland Farm Mut. Ins.
Co., 895 P.2d 626, 630 (Mont. 1995).
46 First Dakota Nat'l Bank v. Saint Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2 F.3d 801, 811-12 (8th Cir.
1993); Clabornv. Wash. Nat'l Ins. Co., 910 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Okla. 1996); Matthews v. Home
Ins. Co., 916 S.W.2d 666, 669-70 (Tex. App. 1996); Roberts v. Allied Grp. Ins. Co., 901 P.2d
317, 319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). Similarly, the presence of an open legal question may
foreclose bad faith liability. See Aceves v. Allstate Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 1473, 1486 (S.D.
Cal. 1993), rev'd in part, 68 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 1995); Frost v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 828
S.W.2d 915, 920 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); J.H. Fr. Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d
502, 510 (Pa. 1993). Where an insurance company learns of legal authority supporting the
insured's position and promptly changes its prior coverage decision, bad faith may be
foreclosed. See, e.g., Harringtonv. Guar. Nat'l Ins. Co., 628 So. 2d 323 (Ala. 1993).
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debatable" policy interpretation, even though that interpretation ultimately
may be rejected by the courts.4 7 Insurance companies may litigate issues of
first impression4 " by filing a declaratory judgment action without being
exposed to bad faith. 49 Arizona courts have adopted fair debatability as a
qualified defense in bad faith cases.o
The linchpin of the tort of bad faith is the "covenant of good faith and
fair dealing," which is implied by law and imputed into all insurance
policies." The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is often
expressed as a promise implied in "every contract that neither party will do
anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the
agreement. "2 A primary benefit flowing from the insurance company's
47 See Mills v. Regent Ins. Co., 449 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), review denied,
451 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1990). Where open legal questions remain, an insurance company may
be insulated from bad faith. See Aceves, 827 F. Supp. at 1484; Frost, 828 S.W.2d at 920; JH.
Fr. Refractories Co., 626 A.2d at 510.
48 See, e.g., First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Rainey, 401 S.E.2d 490, 491-92 (Ga. 1991); Pressman v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 574 A.2d 757, 758-60 (R.I. 1990); Armacost v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 644 P.2d 403, 405-06 (Kan. 1982); CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y v. Norman, 375 S.E.2d
724, 725-27 (Va. 1989).
49 Wierck v. Grinnel Mut. Reinsurance Co., 456 N.W.2d 191, 194 (Iowa 1990); Ballinger v.
Sec. Conn. Life Ins. Co., 862 P.2d 68, 70 (Okla. 1993). An insurance company is not in bad
faith for litigating an issue of first impression. If the insurer learns that the legal authority
previously relied upon does not continue to support its coverage position, however, it may be
required to change its position promptly and resolve the claim. See, e.g., Harrington, 628 So.
2d at 326-27.
50 See, e.g., Ward v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 731 P.2d 106 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) review
denied; Knoell v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 163 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1075 (D. Ariz. 2001). But see
Zilisch v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 995 P.2d 276 (Ariz. 2000) (fair debatability may not
always be sufficient condition to avoid bad faith liability).
51 Kan. Bankers Sur. Co. v. Lynass, 920 F.2d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 1990); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Weiford, 831 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Alaska 1992); Walter v. Simmons, 818 P.2d 214,
223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Pemberton v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 858 P.2d 380, 382 (Nev. 1993);
Pavia v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d 24, 27 (N.Y. 1993); Austin Co. v. Royal
Ins. Co., 842 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). The implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing can be traced back as far as the late nineteenth century. See Germania Ins. Co. v.
Rudwig, 80 Ky. 223, 235 (1882); see also Brassil v. Md. Cas. Co., 104 N.E. 622, 624 (N.Y.
1914); Neal A. Goldberg et al., Can the Puzzle Be Solved Are Punitive Damages Awardable
in New York for First-Party Bad Faith?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REv. 723, 727 (1993). The implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is an outgrowth of society's promotion of reliance on
contracts, and fairness and reasonableness in contractual relationships, which has formed the
public policy of a particular state. See Koehrer v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 828 (Ct.
App. 1986).
52 Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1958); see also Wagonseller
v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1038 (Ariz. 1985).
A few courts have described the duties that an insurance company owes its insured as
those of a fiduciary. See, e.g., Frommoethelydo v. Fire Ins. Exch., 721 P.2d 41, 44 (Cal. 1986)
(stating that because insurance companies hold themselves out as such, they are fiduciaries);
Benke v. Mukwonago-Vernon Mut. Ins. Co., 329 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982)
(declaring that insurance companies have "a fiduciary duty to act on behalf of' their insureds
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express agreement to protect its insured from covered calamities "is the
insured's expectation that his insurance company will not wrongfully deprive
him of the very security for which he bargained or expose him to the
catastrophe for which he sought protection." 53
A breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing can occur
notwithstanding the insurance company's payment of full policy benefits due
on a particular claim.4  The focus of the inquiry is not whether a specific
express provision of the insurance policy has been breached by the insurer
but instead, whether the company's conduct damaged "the very protection or
security which the insured sought to gain by buying insurance."5 5  When
as if their own interests were at stake). Other courts, however, have characterized the
relationship as confidential and have imposed quasi-fiduciary duties on the insurance
company. Typically, courts have prescribed an obligation which describes the duty as
"fiduciary in nature." See Hassard, Bonnington, Roger & Huber v. Home Ins. Co., 740 F.
Supp. 789, 792 (S.D. Cal. 1990) ("[T]he relationship between an insurer and an insured has
many of the elements of a fiduciary relationship, but is not an actual fiduciary relationship.");
Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr. 246, 251-52 (Ct. App. 1990) (stating that an insurance
company's obligation is "akin to fiduciary-type responsibilities"); Tynes v. Bankers Life Co.,
730 P.2d 1115, 1125-26 (Mont. 1986). But see William T. Baker et al., Is an Insurer a
Fiduciary to Its Insureds?, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1989) (arguing that insurance
companies are not fiduciaries).
53 Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 571 (Ariz. 1986).
54 The Arizona Supreme Court in Rawlings has observed:
Failure to perform the express covenant to pay the claim is not the sine qua non for
an action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. To
characterize the cases otherwise, would, in effect, construe them to hold that any
breach of the express covenant would give rise to the tort action for bad faith. We
hold explicitly that such a result is not permitted. Not every breach of an express
covenant in an insurance contract is a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
726 P.2d at 573.
55 Id Compare Paul E. Glad et al., Bad Faith Liability in the Absence of Coverage?, 7 BAD
FAITH L. REP. 1 (1991) (arguing that no bad faith liability can exist absent coverage except in
extraordinary cases), with Stephan S. Ashley, Bad Faith Liability in the Absence of Coverage:
A Response, 7 BAD FAITH L. REP. 6 (1991) (explaining that "the law does not preclude bad
faith in the absence of coverage"). It is well-established under Arizona law that a bad faith
claim has independent standing, irrespective of coverage. Manterola v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 30
P.3d 639, 645 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); Lloyd v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 943 P.2d 729,
737 n.4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (an insurer, however, "can be held liable for bad faith even
when it does not violate any express provision of the insurance contract . . . The covenant of
good faith and fair dealing can be breached even if the policy does not provide coverage.")
An insurance company may be "found liable for bad faith despite the fact that, under the
circumstances, the policy did not require it either to defend or indemnify" the insured. Lloyd,
943 P.2d at 737 n.4; see also Taylor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 1092, 1094
(Ariz. 1996) ("[I]nsurer may breach its duty of good faith without actually breaching express
covenants in the contract."); Deese v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 838 P.2d 1265, 1270
(Ariz. 1992) (breach of express covenant not a necessary prerequisite to action for bad faith);
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conduct is found to be designed to deprive the policyholder of the benefits of
the contract, bad faith may exist, notwithstanding mere technical compliance
with the literal terms of the contract because the remedies available may be
insufficient, undermining public policy. 6 Courts differ on whether a breach
57
of the covenant can be sustained in the absence of specific coverage.
2. The Advice of Counsel Defense
An insurance company may defend itself against allegations of bad faith
claim handling by providing evidence that it relied upon the advice of
competent counsel.' The so-called advice-of-counsel5 9 defense6 0 provides
Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 579 (covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be breached even
when insurer fully performs express covenants of contract).
56 See, e.g., St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 198-200 (Utah
1991). One court has observed that tort liability in this context requires more than the intent to
breach the contract or the intent to deprive the policyholder of benefits. See, e.g., Metro. Life
Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes Int'l, Inc., 192 A.2d 83, 88 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). Several
jurisdictions have rejected tort-based remedies for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. These jurisdictions have allowed recovery of consequential economic
damages for breach of contract by the insurance company. See, e.g., Marquis v. Farm Family
Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d 644, 650-52 (Me. 1993); Lawton v. Great Sw. Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d
576, 579-81 (N.H. 1978); see also Olsonv. Rugloski, 277 N.W.2d 385, 387-88 (Minn. 1979).
Other jurisdictions have substantially blurred the tort/contract distinction in the area of
consequential damages. See, e.g., Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 957 (7th
Cir.).
57 Compare Harbor Ins. Co. v. Urban Constr. Co., 990 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
that absence of coverage, alone, did not preclude recovery for breach of the implied covenant)
with McMillan Scripts N. P'ship v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 243, 247 (Ct. App.
1993) (holding that where no loss covered by policy occurred, there was no breach of the
implied covenant).
58 The following states have adopted the advice of counsel defense: Alabama: Chavers v.
Nat'l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 405 So. 2d 1, 8 (Ala. 1981) (qualified defense) ("While advice of
counsel, along with all the other relevant factors, may be considered by the trial judge in his
determination whether the strongest tendencies of the evidence, if believed, make out a case
for the jury on the 'lawful basis for refusal' issue, it is not necessarily an absolute defense.");
Alaska: Lloyd's & Inst. of London Underwriting Cos. v. Fulton, 2 P.3d 1199, 1206 (Alaska
2000) (admissible as evidence of reasonableness of the insurer's conduct); Arizona: State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 13 P.3d 1169, 1175 (Ariz. 2000); California: State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 279 Cal. Rptr. 116, 118 (Ct. App. 1991); Colorado:
Brandon v. Sterling Colo. Beef Co., 827 P.2d 559 (Colo. App. 1991); Delaware: Tackett v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254, 260 (Del. 1995); District of Columbia:
Wender v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 434 A.2d 1372, 1373-75 (D.C. 1981); Florida:
Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trevethan, 390 So. 2d 724, 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that reliance on the advice of counsel is "evidence to be considered on the issue of
bad faith" but it "does not insulate the insurer" from a bad faith judgment); Indiana: Worth v.
Tamarack Am., 47 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (S.D. Ind. 1999), aff'd 201 F.3d 377 (7th Cir. 2000)
(affirming summary judgment for insurer sued for bad faith where, among other things,
insurer retained outside counsel to render opinion); Massachusetts: G.S. Enters., Inc. v.
Falmouth Marine, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 1363 (Mass. 1991); Minnesota: Christian Builders, Inc. v.
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that when an insurer's actions are in conformity with advice given by its
counsel, the insurer's actions are made in good faith. Thus, state of mind,
Cincinnati Ins. Co., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1232 (D. Minn. 2007); Stan Koch & Sons
Trucking, Inc. v. Great W. Cas. Co., 2006 WL 2331181 (D. Minn. 2006), affd, 517 F.3d 1032
(8th Cir. 2008); Montana: Palmer v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 861 P.2d 895, 907 (Mont. 1993);
Nebraska: Graske v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 647 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (D. Neb. 2009); Nevada:
Mann v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 237, 249 (D. Nev. 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
541 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1976); New Hampshire: Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
56 A.2d 57, 61-62 (N.H. 1948); New York: Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 285 N.E.2d
849 (N.Y. 1972); Decker v. Amalgamated Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 324 N.E.2d 552 (N.Y. 1974);
North Dakota: Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d
638, 646 (N.D. 1979); Oregon: Rose v. Rose, 25 P.2d 1051 (Or. 1933); Pennsylvania:
McAndrew v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 56 Pa. D. & C.4th 1 (2002); Tennessee: Perry v. United
State Fid. & Guar. Co., 359 S.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1962); Vermont: Wash. Elec.
Coop, Inc. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 894 F. Supp. 777 (D. Vt. 1995) (defense
recognized generally but not in the specific context of bad faith); Virginia: CUNA Mut. Ins.
Soc. v. Norman, 375 S.E.2d 724 (Va. 1989) (is a factor to be considered in assessing
reasonableness), otherwise generally recognized as a defense see, e.g., Chipouras v. AJ&L
Corp., 290 S.E.2d 859 (Va. 1982); West Virginia: State ex. rel. United States Fid. & Guar.
Co. v. Canady, 460 S.E.2d 677 (w. Va. 1995); Wisconsin: Berk v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co.,
15 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1944).
For competing views of the scope of advice of counsel and its appropriateness, compare
Michael Sean Quinn, Symposium, The Advice-of-Counsel Defense: A Response to Fischer, 72
TEX. L. REV. 1487 (1994) with James M. Fischer, Symposium, Should Advice of Counsel
Constitute a Defense for Insurer Bad Faith?, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1447 (1994). See generally
Nielsen, supra note 35, at 542-44 .
60 The term "defense" is a misnomer. The advice of counsel is typically accepted as only
some evidence that, if believed, may tend to negate the claim that an insurance company
engaged in bad faith. Advice of counsel is less frequently accepted as an absolute defense to a
claim of bad faith. See Annotation, Reliance on, or Rejection of Advice of Counsel as Factor
Affecting Liability in Action Against Liability Insurer for Wrongful Refusal to Settle Claim, 63
A.L.R. 3d 725, 730 (1975); cf Crowe v. Lucas, 595 F.2d 985, 992 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Reliance
on advice of counsel does not serve as an absolute defense to a civil rights action. Rather, it is
among the calculus of facts that a jury is to consider on the issue of good faith.").
61 Commentators have different views regarding the necessary elements that give rise to the
advice-of-counsel defense. One commentator has delineated four necessary elements of the
defense: "(1) [T]he insurer sought counsel's advice in good faith; (2) the insurer disclosed all
pertinent information to its attorney (3) the insurer acted on the advice in good faith; and (4)
the attorney was competent in the particular area of law and disinterested in the matter."
Nielsen, supra note 35, at 534-35, 543. Professor Quinn has identified criteria associated with
the hiring of counsel to analyze coverage questions: (1) reasonable judgment must be
exercised by the insurer in selecting experienced and competent coverage counsel; (2)
sufficient facts and information must be provided for coverage counsel to render an
appropriate opinion; (3) coverage counsel reasonably appears to have researched, investigated,
and analyzed the issues; (4) coverage counsel communicates the opinion in a reasonable way;
that is, coverage counsel's analysis shows that objective consideration has been given to the
facts and issues, any alternatives, the law, how to present arguments, and so forth; (5) the
insurer thoughtfully considered the coverage opinion; and (6) the insurer largely follows the
advice of counsel. Coverage opinions "are epistolary, single-spaced, and long." Michael Sean
Quinn & Kimberly Steele, Insurance Coverage Opinions, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 479, 484 (1995).
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Although these proposed elements may be jointly sufficient to establish the absence of
bad faith, fewer elements may be necessary:
For example, it is not necessary that the insurer seek counsel's advice in good
faith. The insurer might seek counsel's advice in bad faith and come into a state
of good faith by having been jolted by counsel's vivid, perceptive, and well-
reasoned opinion letter. It also is not necessary that the insurer disclose all
pertinent information to its attorney. The insurer may not have all of the pertinent
information, and might commission the lawyer to complete the investigation.
Moreover, if the opinion letter came to the correct conclusion, even though
missing pertinent information, if the insurer acted on the letter appropriately, and
if the failure to disclose all of the pertinent information was nothing more than
negligent, the opinion letter should still immunize the insurer from bad faith.
Quinn, supra, at 494-95 (1995). However, courts may take a contrary view. In Bertero
v. Nat'1 Gen. Corp., 529 P.2d 608 (Cal. 1974), the court observed:
[I]f the initiator acts in bad faith or withholds from counsel facts he knew or should
have known would defeat a cause of action otherwise appearing from the
information supplied, that [reliance on legal advice] defense fails. Similarly,
counsel's advice must be sought in good faith and "not as a mere cloak to protect
one against a suit for malicious prosecution."
Id. at 616 (quoting Walker v. Jensen, 212 P.2d 569, 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949)) (citations
and ellipsis omitted); see also Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 829 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
("That an opinion is 'incompetent' must be shown by objective evidence. For example, an
attorney may not have looked into the necessary facts, and, thus, there would be no foundation
for his opinion. A written opinion may be incompetent on its face by reason of its containing
merely conclusory statements without discussion of facts or obviously presenting only a
superficial or off-the-cuff analysis.") (citation omitted); id. at n.9 ("An honest opinion is more
likely to speak of probabilities than certainties. A good test that the advice given is genuine
and not merely self-serving is whether the asserted defenses are backed up with viable proof
during trial which raised substantial questions.").
Reliance on the advice of counsel must be reasonable. See, e.g., Bums v. Okla. Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 11 P.3d 162 (Okla. 2000) (acknowledging that reliance on advice of
counsel can be a defense provided that reliance was reasonable, and, because advice of
counsel was against existing case law and statutes, holding that reliance was unreasonable).
This requires, in part, that the insurance company provide counsel with sufficient factual and
other available, relevant information necessary to offer an accurate opinion or advice. See,
e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Smith, 375 S.E.2d 866, 868-70 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that
where insurance company does not provide its counsel with all facts or information necessary
to offer an accurate opinion or advice, it cannot invoke the defense); see also Bertero v. Nat'l
Gen. Corp., 529 P.2d 608, 616-17 (Cal. 1974) ("[I]f the initiator acts in bad faith or withholds
from counsel facts he knew or should have known would defeat a cause of action otherwise
appearing from the information supplied, the [reliance on legal advice] defense fails.
Similarly, counsel's advice must be sought in good faith and 'not as a mere cloak to protect
one against a suit."'). Where an insurance company knows or has reason to know that the
advice of its counsel is incorrect, it will not be able to avoid bad faith liability exposure by
claiming reliance. See Allen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 656 F.2d 487, 489-90 (9th Cir. 1981)
(holding that insurer's reliance on obviously poor strategic advice of defense counsel did not
shield it from bad faith claim). The case law has not addressed the probabilistic relationship
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an essential element that an aggrieved policyholder must demonstrate in
establishing insurer bad faith, can be potentially nullified.62 Conversely, the
regarding the advice provided by counsel and a particular justification for denying coverage.
Professor Quinn has discussed this dilemma:
[I]t is not likely that there will ever be helpful law on this point. It is fairly
obvious, in this context, that if a lawyer advises an insurance company that a given
argument on behalf of no coverage should succeed before a court in a perfectly
rational world, and if there is a sixty percent chance that it will succeed in our
world, then this should constitute enough probability to defeat any suggestion of
bad faith. But there are complications. How the law treats assessments of
probability may depend upon whether the uncertainty derives from fact, or whether
it derives from law. Obviously, in an unsettled area of the law, low probabilities as
to the legal aspects of the opinion do not necessarily mean that there is no
reasonable basis for the carrier's action. Further, the factual aspects of the opinion
may be complicated. An insurance carrier is expected to know what happened with
a high degree of certainty in the absence of conflicting factual scenarios.
Obviously, if there are materially conflicting factual scenarios, probability
assessments are extremely difficult. Material and credible factual disputes may, in
and of themselves, constitute a reasonable basis for denying the claim. The upshot
of this discussion is that there is no obvious connection between the probability
that an opinion is right, and whether the insurance carrier has a reasonable basis for
denying a claim. There is some relationship, to be sure, but the relationship is
complex.
Quinn, supra, at 497-98; see also Clemco Indus. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 665 F.
Supp. 816, 827-28 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that the insurance carrier had not acted in bad
faith when it incorrectly relied upon the definition of "occurrence" which was used to form a
manifestation trigger theory in the 1970s and 1980s but was currently outdated); Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 792 P.2d 749 (Ariz. 1990) (reversing prior
precedent and finding that insurance company should have anticipated a change in the law).
Finally, the advice must be timely. An insurance company cannot bootstrap an incorrect
coverage decision by later consulting with counsel. See, e.g., Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Tompkins, 490 So. 2d 897, 900-05 (Miss. 1986); see also Beacon Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Reynolds,
799 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App. 1990). In Beacon, the insurance company wrongfully denied a
claim which resulted in a state board of insurance complaint. 799 S.W.2d 390. Months after
denying the claim, and only in response to the board's demand, the insurance company sought
counsel. Id. at 397. The insurance company attempted to introduce its counsel's letter at trial
as proof of its reasonable claim denial. Id. The trial court refused to permit the letter's
introduction. The court in Beacon concluded that the insurance company could not have
relied on its counsel's advice in good faith given the timing of the letter. Id.
62 Guy 0. Komblum, The Current State of Bad Faith and Punitive Damage Litigation in the
U.S., 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 812, 838-39 (1988). Many courts have articulated a "fairly
debatable" standard for insurer bad faith. See, e.g., Davis v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 604
So. 2d 354, 358 (Ala. 1992); Deese v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 838 P.2d 1265, 1268
(Ariz. 1992); Garnett v. Transamerica Ins. Sers., 800 P.2d 656, 666 (Idaho 1990); Nassen v.
Nat'l States Ins. Co., 494 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Iowa 1992); Pickett v. Lloyd's (A Syndicate of
Underwriting Members), 621 A.2d 445, 453 (N.J. 1993); Tokles & Son, Inc. v. Midwestern
Indem. Co., 605 N.E.2d 936, 943 (Ohio 1992); Bartlett v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
538 A.2d 997, 1000 (R.I. 1988); In re Certification of Question of Law from the United States
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rejection of counsel's advice 63 or the failure to seek legal advice when
prudent claim handling dictates doing so may be evidence of bad faith.64
Whether the advice-of-counsel defense is available may depend upon a
particular jurisdiction's legal standard regarding the tort of bad faith.6 ' A
definitive standard of bad faith is difficult to formulate because the elements
of the test change as the context changes. Where the insurer's state of mind
is the focus of the bad faith claim of unreasonableness, the advice-of-counsel
defense may be applicable. In those jurisdictions, like Arizona, 8 where the
Dist. Court, 399 N.W.2d 320, 324 (S.D. 1987); Newhouse v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 501
N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Wis. 1993); First Wyo. Bank, N.A. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 1094, 1101
(Wyo. 1993). For a different permutation of the "fairly debatable" standard, see Hans
Construction Co. v. Pheonix Assurance Co., where the court, applying Mississippi law, held
that the retention and use of an independent expert gave the insurance company "arguable
reasons" for denying a claim. 995 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1993). Conflicting opinions of the
insurer's counsel and the policyholder's counsel, after each has reviewed the facts and law,
may legitimize the presence of a fairly debatable dispute.
63 See, e.g., Md. Cas. Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F.2d 616, 620 (8th Cir. 1934); Am. Mut.
Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1932); Kinder v. W. Pioneer Ins. Co., 42
Cal. Rptr. 394, 398-99 (Ct. App. 1965); Thompson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. of N.Y.,
250 So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla. 1971); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trevethan, 390 So. 2d 724,
728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.).
For a cynical discussion of insurer's reliance on advice of counsel, see Lozier v. Auto
Owner's Ins. Co., 951 F.2d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1991) (interpreting Arizona law).
64 See H. Walter Croskey, Bad Faith in California: Its History, Development and Current
Status, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 561, 579 (1991) (opining that insurers may be under duty to
consult with counsel at least in matters involving the reasonableness of settlement demands).
An interesting case is Allen v. Allstate Insurance Co., holding that, under California law, a jury
could find that the insurance company acted in bad faith when it relied on the litigation
estimate provided by counsel rather than on the litigation estimate prepared by the district
manager. 656 F.2d 487, 489-90 (9th Cir. 1981). The court characterized the attorney's
opinion as "wishful." Id. at 489.
65 See Plitt & Plitt, supra note 35, 7:3, 7:4, 7:5 (where authors discuss the various bad faith
standards adopted by the courts).
66 Nielsen, supra note 35. Commentators have offered varying views of how many standards
of bad faith exist. For an analysis of how commentators have offered various opinions on the
standard to determine bad faith, see Boyarski, supra note 35.
67 The link between the advice of counsel defense and the insurance company's state of mind
can be seen in non-insurance cases. As an example, in Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Smith,
the advice of counsel was advanced in a patent infringement case to negate the element of
willfulness. 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The court noted that "counsel's opinion must
be thorough enough ... to instill a belief in the infringer that the court might reasonably hold
the patent is invalid, not infringed, or unenforceable." In Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., the court
noted that the advice of counsel defense does not lie when the legal advice is not sufficient to
instill in the client a basis for reasonable belief in the accuracy and soundness of the advice.
970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The court explained:
This . . . does not mean a client must itself be able to evaluate the legal
competency of its attorney's advice to avoid a finding of willfulness. The
client would not need the attorney's advice at all in that event. That an
opinion is "incompetent" must be shown by objective evidence. For
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tort requires proof of the insurance company's actual intent to harm, the
advice-of-counsel defense may undermine and diminish the required mental
state necessary to establish bad faith. It must be established that the
company knew or should have known that its contact created an
unreasonable risk of harm to the insured.69 Where the alleged bad faith is
based on the insurance company's conduct, the advice of counsel may
become irrelevant because the insurance company's conduct should be
evaluated against industry standards for claims handling and claims
*70processing.
3. Advice of Counsel Waiver
The scope of the waiver that occurs when the advice-of-counsel defense
is raised is unclear. Once the insurance company interposes the advice-of-
example, an attorney may not have looked into the necessary facts, and,
thus, there would be no foundation for his opinion. A written opinion may
be incompetent on its face by reason of its containing merely conclusory
statements without discussion of facts or obviously presenting only a
superficial or off-the-cuff analysis.
Id. at 829. The court also noted:
An opinion of counsel, of course, need not unequivocally state that the
client will not be held liable for infringement. An honest opinion is more
likely to speak of probabilities than certainties. A good test that the advice
given is genuine and not merely self-serving is whether the asserted
defenses are backed up with viable proof during trial which raises
substantial questions.
Id. at 829 n.9.
68 See, e.g., Walter v. Simmons, 818 P.2d 214 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Trus Joist Corp. v.
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 735 P.2d 125 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
69 See, e.g., Webb v. Int'l Indem. Co., 599 So. 2d 1144, 1146 (Ala. 1992); see also Walbrook
Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 517-18 (Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that
establishing good faith involves an inquiry into motive, intent, and state of mind).
70 See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1275 (Colo. 1985) ("Whether an insurer has
acted reasonably in denying or delaying approval of a claim will be determined on an
objective basis, requiring proof of the standards of conduct in the industry."). But see Silberg
v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1109 (Cal. 1974) ("The scope of the duty of an insurer to
deal fairly with its insured is prescribed by law and cannot be delineated entirely by customs
of the insurance industry.").
71 See Conkling v. Turner, 883 F.2d 431, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1989); Bowne of N.Y.C., Inc. v.
AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 487-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); SEC v. Forma, 117 F.R.D. 516, 523
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Standford Junior Univ. v. Coulter Corp., 118
F.R.D. 532, 533 (S.D. Fla. 1987); Russell v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 493 F. Supp.
456, 458 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444, 446-47 (S.D. Fla.
1980); Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
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counsel defense regarding a particular claim, the correspondence between the
attorney and the insurance company is placed at issue and becomes
discoverable.72 A relevant query at this juncture becomes whether reliance
on the advice of counsel acts as an implied waiver of other coverage opinions
prepared for the same insurance company by the same attorney (or the same
law firm). 73 Waiver of the attorney-client privilege for one communication
may in some instances permanently waive the privilege for all related
communications.7 4
II. THE BATTLE FOR IMPLIED WAIVER
A. Expansion of Implied Waiver
Over the past two decades, the Supreme Courts of several states have
rendered significant decisions regarding implied waiver in the insurance bad
faith context. While utilizing previously recognized analytic approaches to
the implied waiver question, these courts set a minimal threshold for waiver
Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 64 F.R.D. 688, 689-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Republic Ins. Co. v.
Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex. 1993).
72 See, e.g., Ellisony. Gray, 702 P.2d 360, 363 (Okla. 1985).
73 One commentator has discussed this slippery slope:
Insurers frequently limit the number of firms they engage to provide
coverage opinions for good reasons. One of them is economic. Another is
that insurance coverage is a niche practice, where reservoirs of learning
and practical experience are extremely valuable. In legal situations where
there are recurrent themes and problems, forms are used. Many coverage
attorneys who have a large number of duty-to-defend coverage opinions to
deliver, develop a standardized discourse upon the [state] law of the duty-
to-defend. This befits a form, and routinely appears in formal opinion
letters.
If the waiver of the attorney-client privilege for a coverage opinion might
lead to the implied waiver of that privilege for other letters, this matter
must be carefully considered. The route from the letter produced, to the
letters not produced is quite simple. The policyholder might take the
deposition of the lawyer who wrote the coverage opinion and ask him
which sections of the letter were canned. If the lawyer identifies several,
and is then induced to go on and say that he frequently relies upon forms,
the policyholder might have the right to discover redacted versions of
other letters on somewhat the same topic.
Quinn, supra note 61, at 496.
74 See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1161-62 (D.S.C.
1974). But see Commonwealth v. Goldman, 480 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (Mass. 1985) (holding
that waiver will only apply to communications relating to same object); Transamerica Title
Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. Rptr. 825, 828 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that disclosure of
limited number of attorney-client privilege materials will not entitle opposing party to the
materials relating to advice given).
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that is the functional equivalent of aper se waiver rule. When presented with
a question of implied waiver, courts are required to make an objective
determination of when the privileged party's conduct reaches a certain level
of disclosure, such that fairness necessitates that the privilege be waived
irrespective of whether or not the privileged person intended such waiver.
For example, in Delaware, the threshold for waiver involved the insurance
company's statement that it had engaged in "routine claim handling." The
Delaware Supreme Court examined in camera the insurance company's
claim file, and, on its own initiative, found sufficient facts to conclude that
* * 75waiver was required.
7 In Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., an insured sued State Farm for bad faith,
claiming that the insurance company had wrongfully attempted to underpay, and then delayed
payment of, an underinsured motorist claim following a company "get tough" policy. 653
A.2d 254, 256-57 (Del. 1995). The "get tough" policy was established to limit an expected
increase in bodily injury claims. Id State Farm took the position that it had "reasonable
justification" for underpayment and delay. Id. at 258. When pressed for an explanation of this
"reasonable justification," State Farm responded by stating in an answer to an interrogatory
that the claims-handling process "show[ed] a reasonable and orderly pattern of claims
handling which ultimately and in due course led to the payment of the policy coverage." Id.
The insured then sought discovery of the basis of State Farm's position. Id. at 257. State
Farm withheld certain documents, claiming that both attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine applied. Id After an in camera examination of the pertinent documents, the
trial court ordered their disclosure. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. In doing so,
the court noted that "waiver of the attorney-client privilege may be implicit, even if contrary to
a party's actual intent." Id. at 259. The court explained that considerations of fairness and
consistency are perforce included in determining waiver. "A privileged person would seldom
be found to waive, if his intention not to abandon could alone control the situation. There is
always also the objective consideration that when his conduct touches a certain point of
disclosure, fairness requires that his immunity shall cease whether he intended the result or
not." Id.
The court noted that a party cannot compel an insurance company to surrender the
protections of the attorney-client privilege simply by bringing a bad faith lawsuit. Id. (citing
generally Hoescht Celanese Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 623 A.2d 1118,
1125 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992)). "Where, however, an insurer makes factual assertions in
defense of a claim which incorporate[s], expressly or implicitly, the advice and judgment of its
counsel, [it] cannot deny opposing party 'an opportunity to uncover the foundation for those
assertions in order to contradict them."' Id.
The court in Tackett concluded that the insured had met the exacting standards for a
finding of implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Id. When State Farm was required
to set forth the reasons to support its claim of reasonable justification for non-payment, it
relied upon the affidavit of one of its claims superintendents who was responsible for handling
the Tackett claim. Id. at 260. The affidavit cited in relevant part the following:
Based on my experience of ten years, this claim was handled routinely,
without any undue delay, with no bad faith on the part of State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company or its employees. Furthermore,
no reason existed to handle this claim unlike any other claim that comes
through this office, and based on my experience, State Farm handled this
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claim as expediently as any other claims office in this local [sic] would
have handled a similar claim.
Id. at 258. Reviewing these facts the court in Tackett observed:
Once State Farm alleged particularized facts that implicitly relied upon
communications with counsel contained in the Tackett's file, the first
prong of the waiver analysis was satisfied-disclosure of otherwise
protected facts relevant to a particular subject matter relied upon as a
defense.... Here, once State Farm alleged a routine handling of the
Tacketts' claim and suggested that any delay was attributable to inaction
on the part of the insured, the Tacketts could challenge those allegations
only with a full showing of the facts contained in the claim file. To rule
otherwise would permit State Farm to gain the inference that, not only was
the claim handled routinely, but the routine analysis of the claim supported
the delay in payment. Fairness requires that assertions of fact be tested by
disclosure. Without access to the complete file, the Tacketts would be
unable to challenge State Farm's assertions and would be forced to accept
as true its claim of routine handling.
Id. at 260. The Tackett court, therefore, recognized that "[a] party cannot force an
insured to waive the protections of the attorney-client privilege merely by bringing a bad faith
claim." Id. at 259. The court also emphasized that the standard for waiver is "exacting" and
warned that its holding "does not create a rule of per se waiver of the attorney-client privilege
in insurance bad faith cases." Id at 259-60.
The court expressly rejected the notion that it was creating a rule of per se waiver of the
attorney-client privilege in insurance bad faith cases. Id The court observed, however, that
where an insurance company "makes factual representations which implicitly rely upon legal
advice as justification for non-payment of claims, the insurer cannot shield itself from
disclosure of the complete advice of counsel relevant to the handling of the claim." Id. At
issue in Tackett was the advice State Farm received from its outside counsel, which was
contained within the State Farm claim file. In its internal evaluation report, a State Farm
claims representative had evaluated the Tacketts' settlement demand and supporting
documentation, and concluded that the claim was valued at between $45,000 and $50,000. Id.
State Farm established a $50,000 reserve on the claim but "ordered an independent medical
examination (IME) because of a suspicion that a prior accident contributed to Mrs. Tackett's
condition." Id at 257. State Farm's outside counsel, however, reported that "the possible
benefit of an independent medical examination is questionable." Id Outside counsel also
advised the State Farm claims representative that "the arbitrator would probably find the
[Tacketts'] claim had a value of $50,000 or more even though it had some obvious
disabilities." Id. The doctor performing the IME "reported to State Farm that Mrs. Tackett
does not have any impressive neurological signs," but that the accident in question did trigger
a prior back condition. Id. As a result of the IME findings, State Farm "authorized payment
of $30,000 with an initial offer of $20,000." Id The settlement offer was rejected, and
counsel for the insured repeated a prior demand for the policy limits. Id. Shortly thereafter,
the file was transferred to a new claims superintendent. Id. The new claims superintendent
concluded, after a full review of the claims file, that State Farm had undervalued the claim.
Therefore, a written offer of policy limits was sent to the Tackett's attorney. Id Although the
court determined that State Farm had waived the attorney-client privilege, the finding of
waiver did not automatically relinquish the protection provided by the work product doctrine.
Id. at 260. Recognizing the landscape of this debate, the court rejected the contention that
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In Ohio, as in Delaware, the court examined in camera the insurance
company's claim file. If the court finds in its review any attorney-client
privileged communications that show a lack of good faith, those
communications are "wholly unworthy of the protections afforded by any
claimed privilege." In Ohio, the mere filing of a bad faith case entitles a
court to an in camera review of the insurance company's attorney-client
* * 76privileged communications.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) grants absolute immunity to opinion work product.
Thus, the court declined to read the mandatory language of the rule as establishing an
impenetrable barrier to discovery of opinion work product. Id. at 262.
76 In a split decision, the Ohio Supreme Court in Boone v. Vanliner Insurance Co., , declared
that "in an action alleging bad faith denial of insurance coverage, the insured is entitled to
discover claims file materials containing attorney-client communications related to the issue of
coverage that were created prior to the denial of coverage." 744 N.E.2d 154, 158 (Ohio 2001).
In reaching its decision that claims file materials showing an insurance company's "lack
of good faith in denying coverage are unworthy of protection," the court summarily dismissed
the argument that its holding would discourage insurance companies from seeking legal
advice. Id. at 157. The court rejected this argument "because it assumes that insurers will
violate their duty to conduct a thorough investigation by failing, when necessary, to seek legal
counsel regarding whether an insured's claim is covered under the policy of insurance, in
order to avoid the insured later having access to such communications, through discovery."
Id.
The court in Boone limited its holding to only attorney-client communications and work
product documents created prior to the denial of coverage. Id. at 158. Although the lack of a
good faith effort to settle involves continuing conduct throughout the entire claims process, "a
lack of good faith in determining coverage involves conduct that occurs when assessment of
coverage is being considered." Id.
Three Justices of the Ohio Supreme Court dissented in Boone. The dissent began its
analysis by stating its allegiance to the public policy considerations underlying the attorney-
client privilege; that is, the encouragement of "full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients" to promote "broader public interests in the observance of law and
the administration of justice." Id. at 160. The dissent observed that there are already
safeguards in place that prevent abuse of the attorney-client privilege. Id. Particularly,
communications in furtherance of a crime or fraud are not deserving of protection. Id. By
adopting its "unworthy of protection" rationale, however, the majority likened
communications in furtherance of civil fraud with an insurance company's communications
with its attorney before the denial of coverage, without recognizing that a conceptual
difference exists between bad faith and civil fraud. Id.
[B]ad faith by an insurer is conceptually different from fraud. Bad faith
denial of insurance coverage means merely that the insurer lacked a
"reasonable justification" for denying a claim. In contrast, an actionable
claim of fraud requires proof of a false statement made with intent to
mislead. Proof of an insurer's bad faith in denying coverage does not
require proof of any false or misleading statements; an insurer could, for
example, act in bad faith by denying coverage without explanation.
Because bad faith is not inherently similar to fraud, there is no reason why
an allegation of bad faith should result in an exception to the attorney-
client privilege akin to the crime-fraud exception.
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Id. (citations omitted).
The dissent addressed what it perceived was the "startling" practical effect of the
majority's holding:
The majority's holding is also startling for its practical effect. After
today's decision, an insured need only allege the insurer's bad faith in the
complaint in order to discover communications between the insurer and
the insurer's attorney. Not even an allegation of the crime-fraud
exception's applicability carries such an absolute entitlement to discovery
of attorney-client communications. In order to overcome the attorney-
client privilege based on the crime-fraud exception, a party must
demonstrate "a factual basis for a showing of probable cause to believe
that a crime or fraud has been committed and that the communications
were in furtherance of the crime or fraud." The rule created today requires
no similar prima facie showing of bad faith before an insured is entitled to
discover attorney-client communications of the insurer. The result of the
majority's decision is a categorical exception to the attorney-client
privilege applicable in any case alleging a bad-faith denial of insurance
coverage. This is a sweeping exception that a number of courts have
refused to adopt.
Id. at 160-61 (citation omitted).
Finally, the dissent found that the majority's holding that insurance company
communications were unworthy of the attorney-client privilege was inconsistent with the
purpose of the privilege. Id. at 161. The dissent stated:
[T]he privilege is designed to encourage open discussion between attorney
and client, so as to promote the observance of the law and allow an
attorney to adequately advise the client. With today's decision, the
majority declares that an insurer's consultation with an attorney prior to a
denial of coverage does not fall within this purpose. The rule laid down
today assumes that an insurer will always have some sinister intent to act
in bad faith when it discusses a coverage decision with its attorney. But
the majority overlooks the fact that an insurance company may consult
with legal counsel to obtain legal advice about a coverage decision. An
insurance company's retention of legal counsel to interpret the policy,
investigate the details surrounding the damage, and to determine whether
the insurance company is bound for all or some of the damage, is a classic
example of a client seeking legal advice from an attorney. These types of
communications further the purpose of the attorney-client privilege and
should be protected in the same manner as a communication by any other
client seeking legal advice from an attorney.
Id. (quotation and citation omitted). Insurance companies "should be free to seek legal
advice in cases where coverage is unclear without fearing that the communications necessary
to obtain that advice will later become available" to a dissatisfied insured. Id. (citing Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. S.F. Superior Court, 200 Cal. Rptr. 471, 475 (Ct. App. 1984); State ex rel.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Mont. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 783 P.2d 911, 916
(Mont. 1989)). The majority's holding would have a chilling effect on an insurance company
seeking legal advice. Id The uninhibited flow of information between the insurance company
and its attorney facilitates the accurate assessment of coverage. Id
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More recently, in Cedell v. Farmers Insurance Co. of Washington, the
Supreme Court of Washington held that there is presumptively no attorney-
client privilege in "first party insurance claims by insured's claiming bad
faith in the handling and processing of claims, other than UIM claims."7 7 In
Cedell, Cedell submitted a claim to Farmers after his home burned down.78
Farmers hired attorney Ryan Hall to provide coverage advice and also to
investigate the claim. 79 Farmers delayed paying the claim, prompting Cedell
to sue Farmers for bad faith.so In the course of discovery in the bad faith suit,
Cedell sought to compel production of communications between Farmers and
attorney Hall."' Farmers objected on the ground of privilege, claiming that
attorney Hall was retained to give legal advice on coverage issues. 8 2
The Washington Supreme Court rejected Farmers' claim of privilege.
With regard to discovery in bad faith cases generally, the court observed:
The insured needs access to the insurer's file maintained for
the insured in order to discover facts to support a claim of
bad faith. Implicit in an insurance company's handing of
claim is litigation or the threat of litigation that involves the
advice of counsel. To permit a blanket privilege in insurance
bad faith claims because of the participation of lawyers hired
or employed by insurers would unreasonably obstruct
discovery of meritorious claims and conceal unwarranted
-83practices.
Because of this need, the court held that the insured is entitled "to broad
discovery, including, presumptively, the entire claims file."8 4  More
specifically, the court stated that it "start[s] from the presumption that there is
no attorney-client privilege relevant between the insured and the insurer in
the claims adjusting process."8 5 The insurer may overcome the presumption
of discoverability by showing that "its attorney was not engaged in the quasi-
fiduciary tasks of investigating and evaluating or processing the claim, but
was instead providing the insurer with counsel as to its own potential
liability; for example, whether or not coverage exists under the law."
7 295 P.3d 239, 246 (2013).
781 Id. 241.
79 Id. at 242.
s
0 Id. at 241.
" Id. at 243.
82 id.
83 Cedell, 296 P.3d at 244-45.84 Id. at 247.
85 Id. at 698-99, 295 P.3d at 246.
86 Id. at 246.
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"Upon such a showing, the insurance company is entitled to the redaction of
communications from counsel that reflected the mental impressions of the
attorney to the insurance company, unless those mental impressions are
directly at issue in their quasi-fiduciary responsibilities to their insured."8 7
It is significant to note that while Cedell stated that this presumption
applied to "first party insurance claims by insured's," federal courts in
Washington applying Cedell have held that the presumption applies in third-
party bad faith cases as well.""
In Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Credit Suisse, Cayman Islands
Branch,89 the United States District Court for the District of Idaho adopted
the reasoning of Cedell. In Stewart Title, Credit Suisse was insured under a
policy issued by Stewart Title. 90 Upon being sued, Credit Suisse tendered the
defense of the litigation to Stewart Title, which it accepted. 91 Stewart Title
hired attorneys at the law firm of Fabian Clendenin to represent Credit Suisse
and hired attorneys at the law firm of Faegre Benson to investigate the
subject of the lawsuit and to provide advice on coverage. 92 Credit Suisse
thereafter sought to compel production of communications between Stewart
Title and the attorneys at Faegre Benson. 93 Stewart Title objected, claiming
that the communications were protected by the attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine. 94
Following the reasoning of the Washington Supreme Court in Cedell, the
court held that Faegre performed the same mixed role performed by the
attorney in Cedell.95 Specifically, at times, Faegre was providing coverage
advice to Stewart Title, and at other times it was investigating claims
alongside Credit Suisse's counsel from Fabian Clendenin. When counsel are
providing such mixed services, the Washington Supreme Court wisely
counseled that "insurers may wish to set up and maintain separate files so as
not to comingle different functions."96
While the court stated that there was no Idaho Supreme Court decision
addressing the issues faced by Cedell, Idaho's Joint Client exception to the
87 id.
Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Omeros Corp., Case No. C12-287-RAJ, 2013 WL 1561963, at *3
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 12, 2013) (finding Cedell applicable to third-party insurance actions
because " [t]he Cedell court grounded its ruling in the quasi-fiduciary duty of an insurer to its
insured, along with the public policy interest in regulating the business of insurance"); Everest
Indem. Ins. Co. v. QBE Ins. Corp., 2:13-CV-00828-RSM, 2013 WL 5885277 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 31, 2013) (finding Cedell applicable to "third-party bad faith actions").
89 2013 WL 1385264 (D. Idaho 2013).





9 Stewart, 2013 WL 1385264 at *4.
96 id
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attorney/client privilege found in Idaho Rule of Evidence 502(d) indicated
that Idaho would follow the same reasoning as was espoused by the
Washington Supreme Court in Cedell.97 Idaho Rule of Evidence 502(d)
states that "there is no privilege under this Rule . . . [a]s to a communication
relevant to a matter of common interest between or among two or more
clients if the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained
or consulted in common, when offered in an action between or among any of
the clients." 98 The court noted that while no published Idaho decision applies
this exception in a bad faith action, "nearly identical language has been
applied to bad faith actions by other authorities." 99 In the present case, the
court held that "Idaho's Joint Client exception would most clearly apply to
communications between Stewart Title and the attomeys at Fabian
Clendenin, retained to represent Credit Suisse. And where Faegre attomeys
worked alongside Fabian Clendenin attorneys to investigate lien claims, the
Joint Client exception would also apply." 00  Thus, the court held that
"Idaho's Joint Client exception aligns with the holding in Cedell, and
demonstrates that if the Idaho Supreme Court were faced with the facts of
this case, they would apply the holding in Cedell to resolve the case."'0 '
Applying Cedell's analysis, the court held that Credit Suisse was
presumptively entitled to Stewart Title's entire claims file.1 0 2  The court
stated that Stewart Title may "overcome this presumption by identifying-in
camera-documents and/or communications where Faegre was not engaged
in the quasi-fiduciary tasks of investigating and evaluating the claim."1 03
Upon such a showing, Stewart Title "is entitled to the redaction of
communications from [Faegre] that reflected the mental impressions of
[Faegre] to [Stewart Title], unless those mental impressions are directly at
issue in their quasi-fiduciary responsibilities to [Credit Suisse]."o4 The court
therefore ordered Stewart Title to review the thousands of pages of
documents in the challenged documents and submit to the Court for an in
camera review those documents at which time the court would determine,
9 Id. at *5.
98 Id.
9 See 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT AND KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5505 (1986). This treatise reaches the conclusion that the Joint Clients
exception was designed to specifically apply to first party bad faith actions between an insured
and an insurer. Id. at p. 551.
100 Stewart Title, 2013 WL 1385264 at *5.
101 Id.
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under the standards in enunciated previously, which should be protected and
which should be disclosed.o0
B. Stemming The Tide Of Implied Waiver: The Intermediate Court Battle in
Arizona
The recent precedents discussed above represent a trend in the law
regarding implied waiver that would have a chilling effect upon attorney-
client communications in the insurance context. The Supreme Court in
Arizona appeared to have been an early adopter of this trend in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Lee. 0 6 However, the Arizona Supreme
Court's ruling on implied waiver in Lee was followed by two more recent
and conflicting Intermediate Appellate decisions. Each of these decisions is
discussed below in order to show how, in at least one jurisdiction, the tide
toward a presumptive or per se waiver rule may be receding.
1. State Farm v. Lee (Supreme Court)
In State Farm v. Lee,ioT the Arizona Supreme Court explored the
contours of the "at issue" implied waiver doctrine as it related to the
attorney-client privilege. i08
105 Id.
106 13 P.3d 1169 (Ariz. 2000).
107 Id.
1os Arizona law provides that information contained in communications between attorney and
client in the context of the attorney client relationship are confidential if maintained in
confidence. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2234 (2003). Generally, the Arizona courts "construe
privilege statutes narrowly because they exclude relevant evidence and impede the fact-
finder's search for the truth." Blazek v. Superior Court, 869 P.2d 509, 511 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994); see also Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Superior Court, 764 P.2d 759,
764 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). This is consistent with the law of other jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mierzwicki, 500 F. Supp. 1331, 1334 (D. Md. 1980) ("Any examination of
the attorney-client privilege should begin with the observation that privileges are not favored
in the law and are seen as a hindrance to litigation."); League v. Vanice, 374 N.W.2d 849, 856
(Neb. 1985); Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689, 693-94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976);
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 77, at 156 (2d ed. 1972) (privilege serves only to "shut out the
light").
Under Arizona law, the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client and serves "to
encourage free exchange of information between the attorney and the client to promote the
administration of justice." State v. Holsinger, 601 P.2d 1054, 1058 (Ariz. 1979). The
privilege encourages clients to tell their lawyers the truth. "Unless the lawyer knows the truth,
he or she cannot be of much assistance to the client." Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d
870, 874 (Ariz. 1993). Thus, the privilege under Arizona law is "central to the delivery of
legal services." Id. The privilege, however, may be waived either expressly or implicitly if
the person that holds the privilege voluntarily discloses information within its purview.
Danielsonv. Superior Court, 754 P.2d 1145, 1148-49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
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In Lee, a class representing approximately one thousand State Farm
insureds brought suit against State Farm contesting the systematic denial of
uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage stacking claims.1 09 Between
1988 and 1995 State Farm rejected stacking"o claims in single loss
situations. It was State Farm's practice to issue separate insurance policies
covering each vehicle in a multiple vehicle household."' When losses
occurred for which there were insufficient insurance funds to compensate the
insured from the other tortfeasor's insurance policies, the State Farm class
members presented underinsured motorist claims to State Farm for additional
compensation.11 2 State Farm rejected these claims based on the wording of
A.R.S. § 20-259.01(H)," 3 which permitted insurance companies to use anti-
stacking policy clauses to eliminate stacking." 4  In 1995, however, the
Arizona Supreme Court, in State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lindsey,"5
determined that the anti-stacking language used by State Farm was legally
insufficient to prevent stacking.ii 6
109 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1171.
110 There are two types of stacking in the automobile insurance context. Intra-policy stacking
can occur when the stated per person policy limits are multiplied by the number of vehicles
covered by the policy. Courts in other jurisdictions have permitted this type of stacking. See,
e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Randall, 753 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Mississippi law);
Am. Ins. Co. v. Takahashi, 575 P.2d 881 (Haw. 1978); Chaffee v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 591
P.2d 1102, 1105 (Mont. 1979); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Maglish, 586 P.2d 313, 314-15 (Nev.
1978); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Milton, 573 P.2d 367, 368 (Wash. 1978). However, the Arizona
courts do not permit this type of stacking. See, e.g., Hampton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 616 P.2d 78
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1980). The court in Hampton rejected the insured's argument that stacking
should be permitted because a separate premium was charged for the coverage available on
each vehicle. In responding to this argument, the court found that the individual premium
charge was justified because of the additional risk associated with covering multiple vehicles.
Id. at 80-81.
Interpolicy stacking arises in multi-policy situations. "Other insurance" clauses are
typically used by the insurance industry to eliminate the stacking of coverages in multiple-
policy situations. The typical anti-stacking clause contains two essential provisions. First, the
policy requires coverage to be prorated. Second, the policy establishes a total coverage limit
available for the loss to which the prorated percentage applies. Unless the policy places a
limit on the amount of the loss, stacking can occur. See, e.g., Barrett v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 220
Cal. Rptr. 135 (Ct. App. 1985); Menke v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.E.2d 1133 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1979); Bishop v. Washington, 480 A.2d 1088 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
. Lee, 13 P.3d at 1171.
112 id
113 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-259.01(H) (2003) (formerly ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-259.01(F)).
114 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1171.
115 897 P.2d 631 (Ariz. 1995).
116 In Lindsey, the court held that the provisions of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 20-259.01(F) (now,
subsection (H)) are not self-executing because the wording of the statute is merely permissive.
897 P.2d at 633. To be effective, "[a]dditional policy language is needed to incorporate the
limitation into a policy." Id.
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The class member insureds argued that even before the court's decision
in Lindsey, State Farm knew the anti-stacking clause was invalid." 7
Therefore, State Farm acted in bad faith when, from 1988 to 1997, State
Farm denied its insureds' requests to stack coverage." 8  State Farm
maintained that until Lindsey was decided, it had acted reasonably in
interpreting A.R.S. § 20-259.01(H) in conjunction with its policy language in
order to preclude stacking. 119
During discovery State Farm acknowledged having received the advice
of counsel regarding whether to pay or reject class member claims. 2 0 State
Farm asserted the attorney-client privilege regarding the production of
counsel's coverage analysis, but declared that it would not advance a good
faith defense based on the advice of counsel.121 The trial court accepted State
Farm's position that it would not advance an advice-of-counsel defense
directly.1 22  Thus, State Farm could not rely upon the objective
reasonableness of its decision to deny stacking. 123 State Farm did "assert that
The importance of having appropriate court "anti-stacking" language in the policy was
demonstrated in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Herron, where the insurance
company argued that stacking was prohibited under Arizona law generally: "[A]ppellee argues
that the law of Arizona does not allow 'stacking' of uninsured motorist coverages and that
appellant may not collect an additional $35,000 under the provisions of his own policy
because this would constitute 'stacking."' 599 P.2d 768, 771 (Ariz. 1979). In rejecting this
argument, the court stated: "We recognized the elementary principle of contract law that if one
wishes to buy more coverage, he may do so and the extent of that coverage will depend on the
terms of the contract." Id. The "other insurance" clause in Herron was an excess type and did
not preclude stacking. Indeed, the court in Herron acknowledged that the case did not involve
a stacking question. Id. at 772. The court gave effect to the excess clause. Id at 771-72.
117 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1172.
118 Id.
119 Id State Farm argued that its position rejecting stacking was not unreasonable because of
the unsettled status of Arizona law. State Farm cited Giannini v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins.
Co., 837 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (Division One holding that anti-stacking
provision in State Farm's policy sufficient to invoke the statute and precluded stacking) and
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lindsey, 885 P.2d 144, 150 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (Division
One again holding that anti-stacking provision in State Farm's policies "plainly encompass[es
the statute's] limitation on stacking"). But see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Berardi, No.
2 CA-CV-93-0051 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (Mem.) (Division Two holding that State Farm was
required to permit stacking of policyholder's UM/UIM claims, resulting in State Farm
allowing stacking for policyholders residing within Division Two's boundaries).
120 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1172.
121 Id. (involving documents with communications between 15 different law firms.).
122 Id. at 1173.
123 Id Like most states, Arizona employs a two-pronged test for insurance bad faith that has
an objective and subjective component. See Haney v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., 2015 WL 58670, *3
(D. Ariz. Jan. 5, 2015). Specifically, the Arizona courts have held that "[t]here are two
elements to the tort of bad faith: (1) that the insurer acted unreasonably toward its insured, and
(2) that the insurer acted knowing that it was acting unreasonably or acted with such reckless
disregard that such knowledge may be imputed to it." Miel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
912 P.2d 1333, 1339 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Trus Joist Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am.,
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its claims managers held a subjective good-faith belief that their decision to
deny stacking was reasonable under what they knew about the state of the
law as it then existed." 24 Because State Farm avowed to the trial court "that
it would defend in part 'on what its decision makers knew, thought and did,"'
the trial court determined "that what State Farm knew included advice of
counsel because that 'was a part of the basis for' the defense." 25 The trial
court held, therefore, "that State Farm impliedly waived the privilege when it
put at issue the subjective legal knowledge of its managers after they sought
and received legal advice." 26
The Arizona Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction and vacated the trial
court's discovery order.1 27 The court of appeals held that State Farm had not
impliedly waived the privilege or put its attorney-client communications at
issue because it had only refuted plaintiffs allegations, and had not injected
privilege-related issues into the case.1 28  As a threshold matter, the court
adopted 2 9 the three-prong test for "at issue" implied waivers set forth in
Hearn v. Rhay.1'30
735 P.2d 125, 134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986)); see also Acosta v. Phx. Indem. Ins. Co., 153 P.3d
401, 404 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). In addressing the objective inquiry, i.e., did the insurer act
unreasonably toward the insured, it has been held that "[u]nreasonable actions include failure
to "immediately conduct an adequate investigation," failure to "act promptly in paying a
legitimate claim," "forc[ing] an insured to go through needless adversarial hoops to achieve its
rights under the policy," "lowball[ing] claims," and similar conduct. Zilisch v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 995 P.2d 276, 280 (Ariz. 2000). As for the subjective question of the
insurer's intent, "[t]he 'intent' required here is an 'evil hand'-the intent to do the act....
[T]he insurer must intend the act or omission and must form that intent without reasonable or
fairly debatable grounds. But an 'evil mind' is not required; the insurer need not intend to
harm the insured." Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 576 (Ariz. 1986). Intent is
established if the insurer lacked a "founded belief' that its conduct was permissible. Id "The
founded belief is absent when the insurer either knows that its position is groundless or when
it fails to undertake an investigation adequate to determine whether its position is tenable." Id.
124 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1173
125 id
126 Id. (emphasis added).
127 In discovery matters, Arizona trial judges have broad discretion and their decisions are
reviewed only for abuse. See Brownv. Superior Court, 670 P.2d 725, 729 (Ariz. 1983).
128 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1173.
129 id
10 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975). Hearn involved a prisoner plaintiff's claim that the
government had violated his constitutional rights by confining him to a mental health unit
without a hearing or review. Id. at 577. The government asserted the defense of qualified
immunity, alleging that it acted in the good faith belief that its actions did not violate any
clearly established constitutional right. Id. The government expressly disavowed reliance on
advice of counsel. Id at 581 n.5. Nonetheless, the Hearn court found that the assertion of the
defense was an affirmative act that made the government's communication with counsel
relevant, and the denial of access to those communications would have been manifestly unfair
to the plaintiff. Id. at 581-82.
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The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the view that implied waiver will
be found only when the party advances an express claim of reliance on
advice of counsel.' 3 ' The court noted that if the client's intent not to abandon
the privilege could alone control the situation, then waiver would seldom be
found. 3 2 Thus, the determination of whether implied waiver has occurred
also includes an objective consideration: when one's conduct reaches a
"certain point of disclosure," fairness demands that the privilege be waived
regardless of the privileged person's intentions.1 33 Turning to this inquiry,
the court recognized that there was "a great deal of confusion" in this area,
and then described various approaches used in other jurisdictions:
At least three approaches to the waiver [issue exists]: the
first approach radically holds that, whenever a party seeks
judicial relief, the party impliedly waives the privilege. A
second approach would attempt to balance the need for
disclosure against the need for protecting the confidentiality
of the client's communications on the facts of the individual
case. The third approach avoids the extremes of an over-
inclusive automatic-waiver or an indeterminate, ad hoc
balancing approach. Instead, it focuses on whether the client
asserting the privilege has injected the issue into the
litigation and whether the claim of privilege, if upheld,
would deny the inquiring party access to proof needed fairly
to resist the client's own evidence on that very issue.134
Privilege is waived under the first two views "whenever a client's mental
state was in issue. ""3 The court observed that this approach was "dubious
absent acceptance of the Benthamite principle that the privilege ought to be
overthrown to facilitate the search for truth." 36 The court in Lee adopted the
third, intermediate approach as being least restrictive. 137 By adopting this
approach, the court rejected "the idea that the mere filing of a bad faith
action, the denial of bad faith, or an affirmative claim of good faith"
constitutes an implied waiver of the privilege.1 38  Waiver will occur,
131 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1178.
132 Id. (citing 8 JOHN H. RIDGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2327, at 636 (J.
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)).
133 Id. The court in Lee questioned where that "certain point" is reached in which fairness
requires waiver. Id. at 1178-79.




137 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1179.
138 id.
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however, if the privileged party has asserted a claim or defense, "such as the
reasonableness of its evaluation of the law," which would include,
necessarily, the information received from its counsel. 3 9 At that point the
privileged party has injected "the issue of advice of counsel into the litigation
to the extent that recognition of the privilege would deny the opposing party
access to proof without which it would be impossible for the fact finder to
fairly determine the issue raised by the party.", 40
The court in Lee concluded that the "certain point" at which fairness
requires waiver is reached is when "the party asserting the privilege claims
its conduct was proper and permitted by law and based in whole or in part on
its evaluation of the state of the law."' 4 ' When this occurs, the privileged
party's "knowledge about the law is vital, and the advice of its counsel is
highly relevant to the legal significance" of the privileged party's conduct.1 42
In this situation, "the truth cannot be found absent exploration of the
issue." 43 A contrary finding would result in "unfairness not just to the party
opposing assertion of the privilege but to the entire [judicial] system." 44
Preemptively, the majority focused on Justice Martone's dissenting
opinion. The court agreed with the dissent that it was the plaintiffs who had
"raised the subjective bad faith of State Farm's employees," but noted that
the waiver of the privilege was not based on State Farm's denial of that
allegation.1 45 Further, State Farm's affirmative assertion of good faith did
not waive the privilege. 46 The court then identified the basis for its decision:
It is, rather, State Farm's affirmative assertion that its actions
were reasonable because of its evaluation of the law, based
on its interpretation of the policies, statutes, and case law,
and because of what its personnel actually knew and did.
But what its personnel did, presumably among other things,
was to consult counsel and obtain counsel's views of the
meaning of the policies, statutes, and case law. Having
asserted that its actions were reasonable because of what it
knew about the applicable law, State Farm has put in issue





143 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1179.
144 Id. at 1179 n.5.
145 Id. at 1180.
146 id
147 Id. at 1180-81.
2015 141
142 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 14, No. 1
Although State Farm did not specifically state that legal "advice was
relevant to the legal significance of its conduct," '4 " an assertion that the
insurance company relied upon advice of counsel would be the "functional
equivalent to an express advice-of-counsel defense." 49 The court noted that
''most sophisticated litigants [would] know better than to dig that hole for
themselves."5 o The concept of implied waiver does not "require such a
magical admission," nor does it require the court to "accept as dispositive the
client's assertion that it did not rely on the advice it received."'' The
majority found that a contrary holding would make "a mockery of the
law."15 2 On the one hand, an insurance company could argue "that it acted
reasonably because it made a legal evaluation from which it concluded that
the law permitted it to act in a certain manner;"'5 3 while, on the other hand, it
would allow that same insurance company "to withhold from its adversary
and the factfinder information it received from counsel on that very
subject. "' 4  In that situation, the "sword and shield metaphor would truly
apply." 55
"By asserting the subjective evaluation and understanding of its
personnel about the state of the law on stacking, State Farm has affirmatively
injected the legal knowledge of its claims managers into the litigation and put
the extent, and thus the sources, of this legal knowledge at issue. "'5 6  The
insurance company will be precluded from testifying "that they investigated
148 d at 1181.
149 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1181.
150 Id
151 id.
152 Id at 1182.
153 id
154 id
155 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1182.
156 Id. The deposition of Gillespie, State Farm's Tucson claims superintendent, demonstrated
the unfairness of this aspect of the judicial system. The review of the deposition indicated that
Gillespie had little or no legal knowledge except that which was supplied to him by State
Farm's counsel. Id at 1179 n.5. When Gillespie was asked to describe the legal training that
State Farm had given him to qualify him to make the evaluation in question, Gillespie
indicated that he could not recall what training he had. Id When asked whether there were
any sources that opposing counsel could look to in order to determine what legal information
would have been available to Gillespie apart from the advice he received from counsel,
Gillespie indicated there were no other sources. Id. The court found that by asserting the
subjective evaluation and understanding of its personnel about the state of the law on stacking,
State Farm had affirmatively injected the legal knowledge of its claim managers into the
litigation and put the extent, and thus the sources, of that legal knowledge at issue. Id. at
1182. The court found that State Farm's claim managers could not testify that they
investigated the state of the law and concluded that they were acting within the law but deny
plaintiffs the ability to explore the basis for that belief and to determine whether it "might have
known its actions did not conform to the law." Id.
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the state of the law and concluded [that they] believed they were acting
within the law but deny Plaintiffs the ability to explore the basis for this
belief and to determine whether [the insurance company] 'might have known
its actions did not conform to the law."" 5 7
The court, however, limited the scope of its ruling. As an example, the
court noted that its holding did not mean that the "privilege was waived as to
communications between the [insurance company] and its counsel on other
subjects pertaining to" the legal question at issue. 58 In essence, "[p]laintiffs
are not entitled to a fishing expedition through all of counsel's
communications . . . but only to discovery of those communications
pertaining to the permissibility or deniability of [the law] under the policy
language, the case law [relevant to that point], and the statutes as they existed
at the time the claims were presented."1 59
Ultimately, the court held that the trial judge had not committed legal
error or abused its discretion by permitting discovery of attorney-client
privileged materials.16 0  The court also approved the Hearn test,'6 ' and
adopted the test set forth in Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers §80(1), which provides, in relevant part, that:
The attorney-client privilege is waived for any relevant
communication if the client asserts as to a material issue in a
proceeding that:
(a) the client acted upon the advice of a lawyer or that the
advice was otherwise relevant to the legal
significance of the client's conduct .162
The notion "that the mere filing of a bad faith action, the denial of bad faith,
or the affirmative claim of good faith may be found to constitute an implied
waiver of the privilege" was rejected.1 63 The court found that a party does not
waive the attorney-client privilege:
[U]nless it has asserted some claim or defense, such as the
reasonableness of its evaluation of the law, which
157 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1182 (quoting Cox v. Adm'r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1418
(11th Cir. 1994)).
15s Id. at 1182 n.8.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 1184.
161 Id. at 1173.
162 Id. at 1179 (emphasis omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 80(1)).
163 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1179.
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necessarily includes the information received from counsel.
In that situation, the party claiming the privilege has
interjected the issue of advice of counsel into the litigation
to the extent that recognition of the privilege would deny
the opposing party access to proof without which it would
be impossible for the fact finder to fairly determine the very
issue raised by that party. We believe such a point is
reached when, as in the present case, the party asserting the
privilege claims its conduct was proper and permitted by
law and based in whole or in part on its evaluation of the
state of the law. In that situation, the party's knowledge
about the law is vital, and the advice of counsel is highly
relevant to the legal significance of the client's conduct.
Add to that the fact that the truth cannot be found absent
exploration of that issue and the conditions of
RESTATEMENT §80 are met. 6 4
State Farm argued that it injected the subjective belief of its claims
personnel into the litigation because the plaintiffs first had alleged State Farm
not only misinterpreted the law but knew that it was doing so. ' Thus, State
Farm argued that the plaintiffs, and not State Farm, had injected the issue of
subjective belief into the litigation. 6 6 After acknowledging that it would be
difficult for State Farm to meet plaintiffs' allegation without affirmatively
alleging that it had investigated and evaluated the law, 6 7 the court stated that
State Farm "could [have done] so simply by denying that it knew it was
acting unlawfully and relying on a defense of objective reasonableness." 68
Plaintiffs would then be forced to prove State Farm knew it was acting
unlawfully.1 69
Justice Martone vigorously dissented from the majority's holding. The
Justice prefaced his dissent by acknowledging and agreeing with the majority
that the Restatement and the Hearn tests "set forth the appropriate
rule ... when a client impliedly waives the attorney-client privilege by
putting assistance or communication in issue."o7 0  Having made these
concessions, the dissent observed that "the Restatement and Hearn [analyses]
require the privilege holder, not the other party to the litigation, to
164 Id. at 1179 (footnote omitted).




169 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1182.
170 Id. at 1184 (Martone, J., dissenting).
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affirmatively inject an issue [that] implicates privileged communications."' 7 '
The dissent emphasized that the Restatement approach required that either of
two conditions be met: "The client acted upon the advice of a lawyer or that
the advice was otherwise relevant to the legal significance of the client's
conduct."172 In that regard, "it [was] not enough 'that the advice of counsel
was otherwise relevant to the legal significance of the client's conduct.""1
73
Instead, it is the client who "must assert that the advice was otherwise
relevant to the legal significance of a client's conduct." 7 4
In Arizona, a bad faith claim requires "proof of both objective and
subjective unreasonableness on the part of the insurer." 7 5 The plaintiff, not
the privilege holder insurance company, "puts at issue the subjective
reasonableness of the defendant's conduct." 7 6 In fact, "the plaintiff must
inject the issue of subjective unreasonableness into the litigation. ,77 This is
so because under the Noble/Zilisch1S test for bad faith in Arizona "the
appropriate inquiry is whether there is sufficient evidence from which
reasonable jurors could conclude that in the investigation, evaluation, and
processing of the claim, the insurer acted unreasonably and either knew or
was conscious of the fact that its conduct was unreasonable.",179 The dissent
criticized the majority because the majority ruling requires a bad faith
defendant to choose between defending against both prongs of the
Noble/Zilisch test, and thereby waiving the attorney-client privilege, or
defending solely on the objective reasonableness of its decision.iso
The practical consequence of the majority's ruling would be that "no bad
faith defendant [could] properly defend the action without waiving the
privilege."i" In that regard, "the majority's application of Hearn and the
Restatement in the context of [the] bad faith case [before it,] completely
subvert[ed] the critical elements of [each] test."18i 2
The dissent observed that under the majority view, "a plaintiff may





175 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1185 (Martone, J., dissenting) (citing Noble v. Nat'1 Am. Life Ins. Co., 624
P.2d 866, 868 (Ariz. 1981)).
176 id
177 Id.
178 Id. at 1185; Noble, 624 P.2d at 868, and Zilischv. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 995 P.2d
276, 280 (Ariz. 2000).
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faith claim on any matter regarding an interpretation of the law." 83 The
dissent further observed that "it may well be that an insurer would be willing
to make a coverage decision without relying on the advice of its lawyers.
But the prudent insurer will consult a lawyer and under today's decision that
advice always will be admissible in an action against [a claim in] bad
faith." 8  Justice McGregor, who dissented but wrote separately, delivered a
eulogy for the attorney-client privilege because of the majority's decision:
Today we make the scope of the attorney-client privilege
uncertain, at best, and abrogate the privilege in many
183 id.
184 Id. Justice McGregor's dissent points to the slippery slope that was created by the
majority's opinion:
But today's holding, which applies not only to plaintiffs' bad faith claim,
but also to the counts alleging fraud, will sweep even more broadly. If a
defendant can waive the privilege simply by relying upon knowledge
gained, in part, through advice of counsel to deny a plaintiff's allegations,
any plaintiff advancing a subjective claim will run the risk of waiving the
privilege simply by filing an action. A plaintiff who advances a subjective
claim seemingly will waive the privilege if, before asserting his claim, he
consults with his lawyer and uses the knowledge obtained to reasonably
evaluate his claim. Because many, perhaps most, potential litigants do not
know the elements of claims they seek to assert before consulting a
lawyer, and do not understand whether they possess sufficient basis to
assert a claim, a plaintiffs decision to proceed with an action necessarily
relies upon the advice of counsel. For instance, these plaintiffs
presumably consulted with their attorneys before bringing this action for
bad faith, which involves the subjective element described by the majority.
If so, their reliance on their subjective and alleged reasonable evaluation
of the law-but an evaluation that necessarily incorporates what the
litigant learned from its lawyer renders the communication discoverable
and admissible. Can the defendant now discover otherwise privileged
communications to determine whether the plaintiffs in fact had a basis for
making their claim? Similarly, a plaintiff in a personal injury action who
claims subjective damages for pain and suffering could be found to have
waived the attorney-client privilege if the knowledge on which she bases
her claim and right to bring it derive, at least in part, from communications
with counsel. If bringing the claim does not itself waive the privilege, is
an assertion from the defendant that the plaintiff lacked a good faith basis
for bringing the claim sufficient to waive the privilege? And if the
defendant's assertion alone does not waive the privilege, surely, in the
words of the majority opinion, the plaintiff's denial of the argument that
he lacked a good faith basis for his claims constitutes an attempt to
establish his mental state by asserting that he acted after investigating the
law and reaching a well-founded belief that the law permitted the action he
took.
Lee, 13 P.2d at 1186-87 (McGregor, J., dissenting) (quotations, citations, brackets, and
ellipses omitted).
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instances, at worst. . . . To permit plaintiffs to discover
communications that they quite probably do not need to
establish their claim, we have placed in jeopardy countless
attorney-client communications, which litigants rightfully
anticipate would be confidential. We also have introduced
needless uncertainty into the attorney-client relationship, and
have discouraged persons from seeking needed legal advice,
which they cannot assume will remain confidential.8 5
2. Mendoza v. McDonald's Corp. (Court Of Appeals)
In Mendoza v. McDonald's Corp.,'8 6 a former employee of McDonald's
brought an action against her former employer for breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in administering her workers' compensation
claim.s7  Mendoza had suffered an injury to her right arm as a result of
tripping and falling while working at a McDonald's restaurant.' 8 Mendoza
was eventually referred to an orthopedic surgeon, Thomas E. Roesener,
M.D., who placed Mendoza on a no-work status, and McDonald's accepted
Mendoza's workers' compensation claim.'89 "As a self-insured employer,
McDonald's [started to pay] Mendoza temporary total disability benefits." 90
Based upon the diagnosed injuries,191 Dr. Roesener scheduled Mendoza
for carpal tunnel surgery and sought McDonald's approval.1 92 McDonald's
refused to approve the surgery, misinterpreting a report prepared by another
physician, Vito R. Del Deo, M.D., as indicating Mendoza's carpal tunnel
syndrome was not work related.1 93 McDonald's sent Mendoza a notice of
claim status denying the carpal tunnel surgery as "not work related." 94
Despite its denial, McDonald's requested that an independent medical
examination of Mendoza be conducted by Ronald B. Joseph, M.D.1 95 Based
185 Id. at 1187 (McGregor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
186 213 P.3d 288 (Ct. App. 2009).1




191 Dr. Roesener initially believed Mendoza had suffered a strained right elbow and mild
damage to her ulnar nerve. Id. Subsequently, however, based on her pain and on nerve
conduction studies performed by Vito R. Del Deo, M.D., Dr. Roesener concluded Mendoza
had injured her median nerve in the accident and was suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome.
Id. Dr. Roesener further concluded that Mendoza had injured her radial nerve. Id.
192 Mendoza, 213 P.3d at 291.
193 id.
194 Id. at 292.
195 Id.
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on Dr. Joseph's examination,1 96 McDonald's sent Mendoza a notice of claim
status accepting Mendoza's claim for benefits.1 97 However, due to the fact
that Dr. Joseph had opined Mendoza could return to a light-duty status,
McDonald's terminated her temporary total disability benefits.1 98 Mendoza
thereafter sent a protest letter to the Industrial Commission of Arizona
("ICA").199  The ICA set a hearing on the issues and Mendoza and
McDonald's each retained counsel to handle the proceeding.20 0
During the pendency of the ICA proceedings, 20 ' Mendoza sued
McDonald's for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
196 Dr. Joseph, like Dr. Roesener, diagnosed Mendoza as having work-related carpal tunnel
syndrome and recommended at least four weeks of conservative, nonsurgical treatment. Id.
Dr. Joseph opined Mendoza could return to light-duty work, although he did not specify any
specific light-duty work restrictions. Id. Dr. Joseph recommended endoscopic carpal
tunnel surgery if the conservative treatment was unsuccessful. Id. Dr. Joseph further
"concluded Mendoza had injured the right radial nerve in the accident and suggested Mendoza
might ultimately need radial nerve decompression." Id.
197 id
19s Mendoza, 213 P.3d at 292. Relying on Dr. Roesener's continuing recommendation,
Mendoza did not return to perform light-duty work offered by McDonald's. Id.
199 Id
200 id
201 During the course of the ICA proceedings, McDonald's requested that a hand surgeon,
Mitchel A. Lipton, M.D., examine Mendoza. Id. at 293. According to a claim file note
prepared by Chargaulaf, "McDonald's ICA counsel had set this examination 'to support [the]
denial."' Id After the exam, "Dr. Lipton reached a 'diagnostic impression' [that Mendoza]
had probable right carpal tunnel syndrome, although he recommended against surgery." Id.
However, "[h]e was unable to determine ... whether Mendoza's carpal tunnel syndrome was
related to the accident at McDonald's." Id. Following this examination, "McDonald's
decided to accept Mendoza's carpal tunnel syndrome as being work related, but refused to
authorize the surgery." Id. Thereafter, at McDonald's request, Dr. Joseph again "saw
Mendoza for another independent medical examination." Id. Based on Dr. Joseph's second
examination, McDonald's offered to authorize endoscopic surgery, a type of surgery that Dr.
Roesener did not perform. Id. Mendoza subsequently "requested McDonald's approve the
carpal tunnel surgery, either endoscopic or classical, and agree to treatment by any qualified
surgeon," but McDonald's refused. Id.
The ICA hearing went forward, with the "ICA administrative law judge conclud[ing]
[that] Mendoza had sustained an industrial injury," that "the carpal tunnel syndrome was
causally related to that injury," and that "she was, therefore, entitled to the surgery as
recommended by Dr. Roesener ('First ALJ Decision')." Id. at 294. "The administrative law
judge found, however, Mendoza was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits ...
because McDonald's had light-duty work available to her." Id. "Mendoza appealed the
temporary total disability ruling . . . and [the Arizona Court of Appeals] set it aside." Id.
(citing Mendoza v. Indus. Comm'n, 1 CA-IC 99-0113 (Ariz. App. June 6, 2000) (mem.
decision)). "Based on the First ALJ Decision, McDonald's approved Dr. Roesener's surgery."
Id. "Although the surgery was deemed technically successful in decompressing the carpal
tunnel," Dr. Roesener was unwilling to release Mendoza to return to work because she
"continued to experience pain and other difficulties." Id. "McDonald's responded by seeking
a second independent medical examination from Dr. Lipton." Id.
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in the administration of her workers' compensation claim (the "Bad Faith
Lawsuit"). 20 2 As part of the Bad Faith Lawsuit, "McDonald's had voluntarily
provided Mendoza portions of the file maintained by its claims adjusters,"
initially without redaction or claim of privilege. 203  Subsequently,
McDonald's began "redacting the adjusters' notes it [had]
produced . . . ('redacted material'), claiming the attorney-client privilege
shielded it from discovery."204 Mendoza then "moved to compel
McDonald's to produce the entire . . . claim file," taking the position that
Mendoza thereafter began to be treated by Leonard S. Bodell, M.D., a hand surgeon. Id.
"Dr. Bodell attempted to treat Mendoza's condition nonsurgically and requested McDonald's
approval to refer Mendoza to other health care providers to assess and assist in treating her
pain problems." Id. "McDonald's refused to approve the requested referrals and instead
scheduled Mendoza to be examined by yet another hand surgeon, Paul M. Guidera, M.D." Id.
"Dr. Guidera concluded Mendoza was not medically stationary and diagnosed possible
persistent radial tunnel syndrome, which he related to the industrial injury." Id. "Dr. Guidera
also recommended, as had Dr. Bodell, that Mendoza be seen by other specialists to assess and
treat her continuing pain problems." Id Dr. Bodell thereafter "asked McDonald's to approve
right radial tunnel syndrome surgery," which McDonald's again refused. Id at 295. Dr.
Guidera thereafter conducted a second and third independent medical examination of
Mendoza. Id.
After the First ALJ Decision was set aside, "a different administrative law judge found
Mendoza had been entitled to temporary total disability benefits from the date of the
accident . . . until her condition became medically stationary ('Second ALJ Decision')." Id.
"The administrative law judge also concluded McDonald's had committed bad faith under
A.R. S. § 23-930 (Supp. 2008) by unreasonably delaying approval of the carpal tunnel
surgery." Id
"[A]t McDonald's request, Peter J. Campbell, M.D., another hand surgeon, conducted
another independent medical examination of Mendoza." Id "Dr. Campbell concluded
Mendoza had right radial tunnel syndrome and would benefit from radial nerve decompression
surgery." Id. "McDonald's thereafter authorized radial tunnel surgery .... which Dr. Bodell
performed." Id. "Although the surgery was deemed successful, Mendoza continued to
experience pain." Id. "Because of her ongoing pain and inability to work, she experienced
persistent depression and asked McDonald's to authorize psychological evaluation and
treatment," which McDonald's refused. Id.
Dr. Campbell thereafter examined Mendoza again and "concluded further therapy or
surgical intervention would not improve Mendoza's subjective complaints of pain." Id.
"Although Dr. Campbell found Mendoza could not tolerate significant heavy lifting with her
right arm, he nevertheless concluded her condition was stable and she was able to return to
work with a permanent restriction of lifting no more than ten pounds with her right arm." Id.
"McDonald's then terminated Mendoza's temporary total disability benefits and continued to
deny Mendoza's request for psychological care." Id. "Mendoza protested both the
termination of her temporary total disability benefits and the denial of psychological care." Id.
"An ICA administrative law judge . . . reinstated temporary total disability benefits, and
awarded Mendoza the additional treatment she had requested, including psychological and
pain management treatment ('Third ALJ Decision')." Id. at 295-96.
202 Id. at 296. Mendoza had three bad faith lawsuits in total, and all three actions were
eventually consolidated. Id
203 Id at 300.
204 Mendoza, 213 P.3d at 300.
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"McDonald's had impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege." 205 Relying
on Lee, "McDonald's denied it had impliedly waived the privilege, arguing it
had never 'put into issue' the redacted material because it was not claiming
its conduct in handling Mendoza's claim was 'subjectively reasonable based
on its . . . subjective understanding of the law."' 2 06
Following argument on the motion to compel and the court conducting
an in camera review of the file, the court found the attorney-client privilege
had not been waived, holding:
[Mendoza] also argues that the attorney client privilege does
not apply under State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Lee . This
court declines to read that case as broadly as plaintiff urges.
In this case, defendant has not claimed that there is no bad
faith because it relied on the advice of counsel, nor has it
claimed as a defense that it relied on a subjective evaluation
of the law that incorporates what it learned from its
attorneys.207
"At the conclusion of a three-week trial [in the Bad Faith Lawsuit], the
jury found McDonald's had acted in bad faith and awarded
Mendoza ... compensatory damages" but not punitive damages. 20 8 "After
the court entered judgment and denied Mendoza's motion for new trial,
Mendoza appealed [and] McDonald's timely cross-appealed." 2 09
On appeal, Mendoza argued that the trial court erred by failing to order
McDonald's to produce the redacted material from the claim file because
McDonald's had impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege.210 Mendoza
additionally argued the trial "court's ruling prejudiced her case by depriving
her of relevant evidence that McDonald's had acted with the necessary 'evil
mind' to allow the jury to assess a punitive damages award." 2 11 The Arizona
212Court of Appeals agreed with both of Mendoza's arguments on this issue.
In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeals observed that the decision
in Lee "outlined the test for determining whether an insurer has impliedly
waived the attorney-client privilege in a bad faith tort action."213 Applying
the reasoning of Lee, Mendoza argued that "McDonald's impliedly waived
the privilege . . . because its ICA attorneys regularly influenced and directed
205 id
206 id
207 Id. (citation omitted).
208 Id at 297.
209 id





McDonald's claims decisions and, by representing its actions were
subjectively reasonable . . . while [concurrently] asserting the privilege, it
was able to hide the real reasons for its decisions."214 In response,
McDonald's argued that "Lee and its treatment of implied waiver [was]
inapplicable [to this case] because [McDonald's] did not defend its actions
based on the reasonableness of its subjective evaluation of the law." 215
McDonald's instead argued that "it defended its actions [solely] by
contending they were objectively reasonable."216
The court in Mendoza agreed that McDonald's did not defend on the
basis that "its subjective evaluation of the law was reasonable." 2 17 However,
the court stated that "there is nothing in Lee to suggest an insurer will only be
deemed to impliedly waive the privilege when it argues its actions were
reasonable based on its subjective evaluation of the law."218 Instead, the
court observed:
At the heart of Lee is the recognition that, in the bad faith
context, when an insurer raises a defense based on factual
assertions that, either explicitly or implicitly, incorporates
the advice or judgment of its counsel, it cannot deny an
opposing party the opportunity to discover the foundation for
those assertions in order to contest them.219
Further, the court held that, contrary to the characterization made by
McDonald's, the defense was not limited to the objective reasonableness of
McDonald's conduct.220 Instead, McDonald's "affirmatively asserted its
actions in investigating, evaluating, and paying Mendoza's claim were
subjectively reasonable and taken in good faith."221
"Through the testimony of its bad faith expert witness, Robert
Wisniewski, McDonald's presented evidence it had not used independent
medical examinations to deny or delay benefits, despite adjuster notes that
stated certain examinations were being scheduled to 'cut' benefits or support
a previous denial of benefits."222 Wisniewski testified that "references
[made] in the notes to 'get this claim closed' or other similar wording
constituted nothing more than 'jargon' [used by adjusters] for moving a
214 Id at 301.
215 id.
216 Mendoza, 213 P.3d at 301.
217 Id. at 302.
218 id.
219 Id. (citing Lee, 13 P.3d at 1178).
220 id.
221 id.
222 Mendoza, 213 P.3d at 302.
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claim from one stage to another." 223 He further testified that McDonald's
was not improperly attempting to close the claim by trying to find a doctor
who would provide it with an examination supporting closure.22 4 Instead,
Wisniewski also explained that "the reason [that the] adjusters had sent
Mendoza to so many different doctors was [that] 'they were trying to give
her the benefit of the doubt,' and were 'trying to find out what [was] wrong
with her and address it."'
22 5
Jennifer Chargaulaf, the McDonald's employee who initially handled
Mendoza's claim gave similar testimony, stating that "she had never tried to
deny . . . or delay [Mendoza's claim] 'with either the hope that [Mendoza]
would give up or go away."' 22 6 Instead, "she had believed the findings of
Drs. Del Deo, Joseph, and Lipton provided a reasonable basis for [denying
the request for surgery] .227 She additionally testified that she and the other
claim handlers had been "motivated by a desire to make sure that Mendoza
received 'the care that was most appropriate or at least [she] explored her
-,228
options.
The Arizona Court of Appeals observed that by using this evidence to
depict the actions of its claims adjusters as being driven by a desire to act in
Mendoza's best interest, "McDonald's affirmatively placed in issue the
subjective motives of its adjusters in administering Mendoza's claim."229
The court therefore held that McDonald's "defended [the] case based on the
subjective reasonableness of its conduct," not just objective
bl230
reasonableness.
With this understanding, the court then examined the evidence, which
belied the portrayal of McDonald's subjective motives in handling
Mendoza's claim. 23 1 The court observed that this evidence indicated that
"McDonald's forced Mendoza to 'go through needless adversarial hoops to
achieve' her workers' compensation benefits, . . . based on advice from and
judgments made by its ICA counsel."232 Specifically, the factual evidence






228 Mendoza, 213 P.3d at 302-03.
229 Id. at 303.
230 id
231 id
232 Id. (citation omitted).
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(1) Chargaulaf testified that she scheduled an independent
medical examination ("IME") of Mendoza "based on the
recommendation of its ICA attorney";233
(2) Chargaulaf testified that "it was possible the ICA
attorney wanted to find a doctor who would disagree
with [another doctor's] conclusion [that] Mendoza's
carpal tunnel syndrome was work related and who would
support the denial of benefits"; 234
(3) Chargaulaf testified that "despite her decision accepting
Mendoza's carpal tunnel syndrome as compensable . . .,
on advice of counsel, McDonald's then began to assert
Mendoza's carpal tunnel syndrome was not work
related, . . . a position with which [the adjuster] did not
agree and thought would be in bad faith"; 23 5
(4) In a claim note, Chargaulaf "confirmed she had spoken to
one of McDonald's ICA attorneys who informed her he
would 'set up another independent medical exam to
support our denial. He will also forward us a list of
good doctors in the state '".;236
(5) Chargaulaf testified "that even though she had notified
Mendoza in July 1998 McDonald's would accept
Mendoza's carpal tunnel syndrome as compensable, she
relied on counsel's advice in delaying surgical
authorization through the end of her involvement with
the claim in December 1998",;237 and
(6) A subsequent adjuster testified that "she had relied on the
advice of one of McDonald's ICA attorneys in . . . ,
scheduling an independent medical examination with Dr.
Guidera 'for closure' and to '[g]et this claim closed."'
238
While the Court of Appeals did not need to determine whether
McDonald's subjective motives were as it represented or not, the court
concluded that by electing to defend "on the subjective, not just objective,
reasonableness of its adjusters' actions, McDonald's placed in issue their
subjective beliefs and directly implicated the advice and judgment they had
received from McDonald's ICA counsel incorporated in those actions." 239
233 id.
234 Mendoza, 213 P.3d at 303.
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Therefore, "the advice and judgment [McDonald's] adjusters received from
its ICA counsel [became] relevant to the case" and the privilege was
impliedly waived.240
3. Everest Indemnity Insurance Company v. Rea (Court Of Appeals)
In Everest Indemnity Insurance Company v. Rea,241 the Arizona Court of
Appeals once again addressed the issue of implied waiver of the attorney-
client privilege under Lee.242  In the Everest case, Rudolfo Brothers
Plastering and Western Agricultural Insurance Company (collectively
"Rudolfo") claimed that Everest committed bad faith in the underlying case
by entering into a settlement agreement in favor of some insureds by which
the liability coverage of an Owner Controlled Insurance Program ("OCIP")
policy was exhausted to the alleged detriment of other insureds such as
Rudolfo Brothers Plastering.243 Everest took the position that "the decision
to settle was made in good faith," based on both objective reasonableness and
Everest's subjective beliefs concerning the relative merits of the various
available courses of action.244 Everest acknowledged that during the process
of making the decision to settle the underlying case, Everest communicated
with counsel.245  Therefore, "the issue [was] whether Everest impliedly
waived the attorney-client privilege regarding those communications by
asserting its subjective belief in the good-faith nature of its actions and by
consulting with counsel during that period of time." 24 6
The Court of Appeals observed that Rudolfo relied on the decision in
Mendoza, "for the proposition that by choosing to defend itself based on the
subjective reasonableness of its actions after consulting with counsel, Everest
240 Mendoza, 213 P.3d at 303. (citing Lee, 13 P.3d at 1178 ("'Where an insurer makes factual
assertions in defense of a claim which incorporate, expressly or implicitly, the advice and
judgment of its counsel, it cannot deny an opposing party 'an opportunity to uncover the
foundation for those assertions in order to contradict them."' (quoting Tackett v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254, 259 (Del. 1195) (citations and ellipsis omitted)))); Roehrs
v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 228 F.R.D. 642, 646-47 (D. Ariz. 2005) (three adjusters testified in
pretrial depositions they considered and relied upon legal opinions and legal investigation in
denying coverage for insureds' claims; because insurer could not 'reasonably deny that what
these employees knew at the time they denied the [insureds'] claims included information
received from their lawyers' and '[w]hat formed the subjective good faith beliefs and mental
states of these three adjusters and the reasonableness of their decisions [was] critical in
defense of the [insureds'] bad faith claim,' insurer had placed attorney-client privileged
material at issue and impliedly waived the privilege under Lee).").
241 342 P.3d 417 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015).
242 Id. at 418.
243 id
244 Id. at 418, 418 n.1.
245 Id. at 418.
246 id
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has necessarily waived the attorney-client privilege." 2 47 In other words, the
position of Rudolfo, and the ruling of the trial court, was that Mendoza
created a per se rule that defending a bad faith case based upon subjective
reasonableness automatically waived the privilege. 2 48 However, the Court of
Appeals rejected this argument as over-reading Mendoza and being
inconsistent with Lee.249 Indeed, the court observed that "Lee expressly held
that the assertion of a subjective good faith defense coupled with consultation
with counsel did not, without more, waive the attorney-client privilege." 2 50
The Court of Appeals observed that under Lee, "the attorney-client
privilege is impliedly waived only when the litigant asserts a claim or
defense that is dependent upon the advice or consultation of counsel." 251
Specifically, in Lee, the insurer was held to have waived the attorney-client
privilege "because its defense was based on its 'investigation and evaluation'
of the law, which [was] inevitably depende[nt] [upon] and necessarily
included the advice [the insurer] received from its lawyers."252 The Court of
Appeals noted that because the coverage issue in Lee "turned on State Farm's
interpretation of recently-decided case law . . . , 'the party's knowledge about
the law is vital, and the advice of counsel is highly relevant to the legal
247 Everest Indemnity Ins. Co., 342 P.3d at 419.
248 Id at 420 (Orozco, J., dissenting).
249 Id at 419.
250 Id "We assume client and counsel will confer in every case, trading information for
advice. This does not waive the privilege. We assume most if not all actions taken will be
based on counsel's advice. This does not waive the privilege. Based on counsel's advice, the
client will always have subjective evaluations of its claims and defenses. This does not waive
the privilege. All of this occurred in the present case, and none of it, separately or together,
created an implied waiver." Id (quoting Lee, 13 P.3d at 1183).
251 Id. The Court in Lee stated:
But the present case has one more factor-State Farm claims its actions
were the result of its reasonable and good-faith belief that its conduct was
permitted by law and its subjective belief based on its claims agents'
investigation into and evaluation of the law. It turns out that the
investigation and evaluation included information and advice received
from a number of lawyers. It is the last element, combined with the
others, that impliedly waives the privilege. State Farm claims that its
actions were prompted by what its employees knew and believed, not by
what its lawyers told them. But a litigant cannot with one hand wield the
sword-asserting as a defense that, as the law requires, it made a
reasonable investigation into the state of the law and in good faith drew
conclusions from that investigation-and with the other hand raise the
shield-using the privilege to keep the jury from finding out what its
employees actually did, learned in, and gained from that investigation.
Id. (quoting Lee, 13 P.3d at 1183) (emphasis added)).
252 Everest Indemnity Ins. Co., 342 P.3d at 419 (citing Lee, 13 P.3d at 1183).
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significance of the client's conduct."' 253 As a result, the court explained that
State Farm's actions were therefore "inextricably intertwined" with the
advice it received from counsel and the Supreme Court held that State Farm
had impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege.254
In order to waive the attomey-client privilege under Lee, the Court of
Appeals stated that "a party must make an affirmative claim that its conduct
was based on its understanding of the advice of counsel-it is not [enough]
that the party consult with counsel and receive advice." 255 In contrast, the
Court of Appeals held that in the present case, "there has been no showing
that Everest was in doubt as to any legal issue."256 Instead, Everest "made
decisions during the course of litigation and, of necessity, involved lawyers
in that litigation." 25 7 "The decision Everest made to settle the case was not
necessarily the product of legal advice, and Everest has not yet asserted-
expressly or impliedly-that it was." 2 58
Addressing Mendoza, the Court of Appeals observed that the employer
"relied on the advice of counsel in scheduling independent medical
examinations and determining whether to issue surgical authorization for an
employee's worker's compensation claim." 25 9 Indeed, the employer in that
case "expressly admitted that it had relied substantially on the advice
of ... counsel in reaching its decisions." 26 0 The Court of Appeals stated that
"Mendoza found the attomey-client privilege was impliedly waived under
Lee" because a claim that those decisions, "made based on the advice of
counsel, . . . were made in subjective good faith necessarily depends upon the
information the client had learned from [counsel]."26 '
In Everest, the Court of Appeals held that "Everest's defense [fell] short
of the Lee and Mendoza requirements for an implied waiver."262 The court
acknowledged that Everest: (1) was contending "that it acted with a
subjective belief in the good-faith nature of its actions"; (2) admitted to
consultation with counsel "before making the decision to enter into the
settlement agreement"; and (3) admitted that its "counsel were involved in
the settlement negotiations." 2 63  The court held, however, that these facts
253 Id. (quoting Lee, 13 P.3d at 1179).
254 Id. (citing Lee, 13 P.3d at 1177).
255 Id. (citing Lee, 13 P.3d at 1177); see also Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Burke, 63 P.3d 282,
287 (2003) ("finding that no waiver of privilege occurred when party had not 'affirmatively
injected any advice it received from counsel into the bad faith action"').
256 Id at 420.
257 id
258 Everest Indemnity Ins. Co., 342 P.3d at 420.
259 Id. (citing Mendoza, 213 P.3d at 303).
260 Id. (citing Mendoza, 213 P.3d at 303).
261 Id. (citing Mendoza, 213 P.3d at 304).
262 Id at 420.
263 id
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alone were "not enough to suggest that Everest's subjective belief in the
legality of its actions necessarily included or depended on the advice it
received from counsel."264 The Court of Appeals observed that Everest had
not yet asserted as a defense that it depended on "advice of counsel in
forming its subjective beliefs regarding the appropriate course of conduct" in
reaching and entering into the settlement.26 5  The court further noted that
Everest had "not yet seen the need to share the advice of its counsel with its
own [bad faith] expert" and that Everest's "expert simply cite[d] the fact of
consultation as a procedural indication of good faith." 26 6 Therefore, the court
held that "Everest ha[d] not yet placed the advice it received from counsel at
issue" and vacated the trial court's order regarding implied waiver of
Everest's attorney-client privilege.267
In the dissent, Judge Orozco agreed with the conclusion of the majority
that the mere fact that an insurer asserts a "subjective good faith defense does
not, by itself, waive the attorney-client privilege." 268 Consequently, she also
agreed with the majority that Mendoza does not establish automatic waiver of
privilege upon asserting subjective good faith but was instead a fact-based
application of Lee. 26 9 The dissent disagreed however that "'Everest had not
yet asserted a defense that it depended on the advice of counsel in forming its
subjective beliefs[.]"' 27 0 Specifically, Judge Orozco held that two facts gave
rise to the affirmative interjection of the advice of counsel: (1) "Everest has
asserted in its initial disclosure statement and in response to interrogatories
that it acted in good faith by reaching the settlement at issue"; and (2)
Everest's counsel participated in the settlement negotiations on Everest's
behalf.271 Thus, the dissent viewed "[c]ounsel's participation, along with
Everest's assertion of subjective good faith, is an affirmative interjection of
counsel's role in formulating and acting upon Everest's subjective good faith
* * 272in this litigation."
264 Everest Indemnity Ins. Co., 342 P.3d at 420 (citing Lee, 13 P.3d at 1183).
265 Id. at 420.
266 id.
267 id.
268 Id. (Orozco, J., dissenting).
269 Id. (Orozco, J., dissenting).
270 Everest Indemnity Ins. Co., 342 P.3d at 420 (Orozco, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
271 Id. at 420-21. (Judge Orozco, dissenting).
272 Id at 421 (citing Empire West Title Agency, L.L.C. v. Talamante, 323 P.3d 1148, 1150
(2014) (citing Lee, 13 P.3d at 1179) (noting that Lee requires "the party claiming the privilege
must affirmatively interject the issue of advice of counsel into the litigation" (quotations
omitted))).
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C. Defining The Battle Lines
The battle being waged is clear. On one side, jurisdictions such as Ohio,
Delaware, Washington and Idaho represent and stand behind the continued
expansion of implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege in the context of
insurance bad faith. In contrast, the intermediate court battle in Arizona may
signal a turn in the tide relative to continued expansion. This change in
Arizona stands in stark contrast to these other jurisdictions and serves as a
case study of the significant implications of this battle.
Arizona, consistent with the majority of jurisdictions,2 73 employs a two-
pronged test for insurance bad faith, which has an objective and subjective
274
component. 2 Specifically, the two elements of this test are: "(1) that the
insurer acted unreasonably toward its insured, and (2) that the insurer acted
knowing that it was acting unreasonably or acted with such reckless
disregard that such knowledge may be imputed to it."275 Consistent with this
273 See Gen. Star Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 960 F.2d 377, 380 (3rd Cir. 1992)
(interpreting New York law); Matt v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 798 F. Supp. 429, 434 (W.D. Ky.
1991), aff'd, 968 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1992) (interpreting Kentucky law); Balzer v. Am. Family
Ins. Co., 805 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624-25 (N.D. Ind. 2011) ("a successful bad faith claim is
composed of an objective element (such as the lack of a reasonable basis to deny a claim) and
a subjective element (such as the knowledge of the lack of a reasonable basis to deny a
claim.)"); White v. Cont'l Gen. Ins. Co., 831 F. Supp. 1545, 1555 (D. Wyo. 1993); Turner
Constr. Co. v. First Indem. of Am. Ins. Co., 829 F. Supp. 752, 762-64 (E.D. Pa. 1993); First
Marine Ins. Co. v. Booth, 876 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Ark. 1994); Wittmer v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d
885, 890-92 (Ky. 1993); Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Veasley, 610 So. 2d 290, 295 (Miss.
1992); Dolan v. AID Ins. Co., 431 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1988); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v.
Citizensbank of Thomasville, 491 So. 2d 880, 882 (Ala. 1986); Ganaway v. Shelter Mut. Ins.
Co., 795 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); see also Mission Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life &
Cas. Co., 687 F. Supp. 249, 253 (E.D. La. 1988) (requiring "something more than mere error
of judgment" to show insurer bad faith); Galusha v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 844 F. Supp. 1401,
1404 (D. Colo. 1994); Brown v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 513 N.W.2d 762, 763 (Iowa 1994);
Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 18 (Tex. 1994); Turner v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 614 So.2d 1029, 1032 (Ala. 1993); Terletsky v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 649
A.2d 680, 688 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Weatherly v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ins. Co., 513
N.W.2d 347, 354 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994); Ness v. W. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 122, 125
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). But see Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 628 N.E.2d 14, 17
(Mass. 1994); Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766, 776 (W. Va. 1990);
Gelinas v. Metro. Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 551 A.2d 962, 966 (N.H. 1988); Mock v. Mich.
Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 607 (Ct. App. 1992); Ind. Ins. Co. v. Plummer
Power Mower & Tool Rental, Inc., 590 N.E.2d 1085, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
274 Haney v. ACE American Ins. Co., 2015 WL 58670, *3 (D. Ariz. 2015).
275 Nardelli v. Metro. Grp. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 277 P.3d 789, 794-95 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012)
("An insurer acts in bad faith when it unreasonably investigates, evaluates, or processes a
claim (an 'objective' test), and either knows it is acting unreasonably or acts with such
reckless disregard that such knowledge may be imputed to it (a 'subjective' test)."); Miel v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 1333, 1339 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Trus Joist
Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 735 P.2d 125, 134 (Ariz. Ct. App.1986)); see also Acosta v.
Phoenix Indem. Ins. Co., 153 P.3d 401, 404 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
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fact, every claim for bad faith necessarily involves a plaintiff having to make
an objective showing that the insurance company acted unreasonably and a
subjective showing that the insurance company knew it was acting
unreasonably.2 76  Consequently, offering a complete defense to a bad faith
claim requires the insurance company to contest both the objective and
subjective elements of a plaintiff's bad faith claim.
In accordance with this understanding, a per se rule of implied waiver
where an insurance company defends on the subjective element of the claim
would mean that in every bad faith case in which an insurance company
consults an attorney, the insurance company-like ancient seafarers in Greek
mythology-will be placed squarely between Scylla and Charybdis:2 77 the
company must either waive its' right to defend against the subjective element
of a bad faith claim or else waive the attorney-client privilege for
communications with its' counsel. If the insurance company chooses the
former, it loses its ability to present any defense as to half of the bad faith
case. If, on the other hand, the latter is chosen, the insurance company loses
the significant and closely-guarded protection of the attorney-client privilege.
Either way the insurance carrier loses. This is a choice no other holder of the
privilege is forced to make in any other context and is a choice an insurance
company should not be forced to make either.
In fact, forcing an insurer to make this choice cuts against the heightened
nature of proving bad faith. It is the subjective element of the bad faith
claim-the insurer's subjective state of mind-which turns an ordinary
breach of contract claim into the tort of bad faith. If the insurer gives up its
defense on the subjective element of the claim, the plaintiff is effectively
been granted the ability to prove bad faith merely by showing a breach of
contract. On the other hand, if the insurer elects to defend on the subjective
element and the plaintiff actually has to prove true bad faith, the plaintiff is
automatically given the benefit of a waiver of the attorney client privilege.
Therefore, a plaintiff either does not have to meet the heightened standard of
bad faith all or, if they do have to meet this standard, they get an advantage
no other plaintiff received in that they get an automatic waiver of the
attorney-client privilege.
It is also a choice which severely undermines the public policy
underlying the attorney-client privilege. It has been observed that "[t]he
purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage a client to confide in
276 Tins Joist Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 735 P.2d 125, 134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
277 "In The Odyssey by the Greek poet Homer, Odysseus was confronted at one point in his
attempt to return home with having to navigate his ship between Scylla, a cliff-dwelling
monster who snatched and devoured sailors from passing ships, and Charybdis, a whirlpool
capable of dragging down the entire ship. Thus, Odysseus had the unenviable task of
choosing between the loss of part of his ship's crew and the loss of the entire ship and crew."
Smithy. English, 586 So. 2d 583, 594 n.1 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
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his or her attorney all the information necessary in order that the attorney
may provide effective legal representation." 278 Indeed, "[t]he attorney-client
privilege is the oldest of privileges for confidential communications and is
rigorously guarded to encourage full and frank communications between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of law and the administration of justice." 2 79
A per se rule of implied waiver in this context would not only discourage
full and frank communications between an insurance company and its
counsel, it would actually discourage insurance companies from ever seeking
the advice of counsel in coverage matters because of the risk that all such
communications could be discoverable in a subsequent bad faith action. This
is detrimental to both insurance companies and insureds alike. The wide-
ranging impact of the battle therefore cannot be overstated.
III. CONCLUSION
An insurance company should not lose the protection of the attorney-
client privilege simply because its litigation opponent raises an issue to
which advice of counsel may be relevant. Implied waiver can only occur
when the privilege holder affirmatively injects advice of counsel into the
litigation. If the privilege holder does not use advice of counsel as a sword,
there is no basis for stripping him or her of its shield. For this reason, courts
throughout the country have consistently held that an insurer's mere denial of
a bad faith allegation is not sufficient to waive the attorney-client
privilege.
Even in those jurisdictions where a Hearn-type "issue" analysis is
applied, more than a mere denial has been required to waive the privilege in
the context of insurance bad faith. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
determined that waiving "the attorney-client privilege by voluntarily
injecting an issue in the case, a defendant must do more than merely deny a
plaintiff's allegations. The holder must inject a new factual or legal issue
278 Granger v. Wisner, 656 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Ariz. 1982).
279 State v. Sucharew, 66 P.3d 59, 64 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Towery, 920 P.2d
290, 299 n.6 (Ariz. 1996)) (citation and quotations omitted).
280 See, e.g., Chi. Meat Processors, Inc. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., No. 1996 WL 172148, at
*11-12, (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 1996) (rejecting argument that insurance company waived attorney-
client privilege on grounds that insurance company did "not raise[] as an affirmative defense
reliance on counsel in support of its defense to the [bad] faith claim," but instead "simply
denied [insured's] allegations of bad faith [which] is insufficient to waive the privilege.");
Barr Marine Prods. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631, 635 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding
that privilege is not waived merely by defending a suit, but by "rais[ing] as a defense that
which transpired between client and counsel, or reliance on advice of counsel, or questions
counsel's authority").
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into the case." 28' Merely offering "a new form of evidence to counter an
issue injected by the plaintiffs," such as bad faith, does not waive the
privilege.282 The suggestion that an insurance company affirmatively argues
its good faith ignores that good faith in the insurance context is merely the
absence of bad faith.283 Indeed, as a technical matter, a "bad faith" claim is
an allegation that the insurer has breached its implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Plaintiffs will typically raise an insurance company's good
faith, or lack thereof, in their complaint, and the insurance company should
not be required to waive its privilege by denying those allegations. 2 84
Insureds could simply induce an automatic waiver by accusing an
insurance company of bad faith. A claim that an insurance company's "state
of mind" is at issue, would lead to a demand to examine privileged materials
as a matter of "fairness," on the theory that advice of counsel must have
contributed to the insurer's state of mind. The only way by which an
insurance company could effectively avoid this result is by not defending on
its "state of mind"-the subjective reasonableness of its actions-and
limiting its defense to solely the objective element of the defense to bad faith.
In Lee, the Arizona Supreme Court held that fairness of the judicial
process requires implied waiver whenever the insurance company "claims its
conduct was proper and permitted by law and based in whole or in part on its
evaluation of the state of the law."285 A pointed dissent in Lee delivered a
eulogy for attorney-client privilege in insurance bad faith cases, as a result of
the majority's decision. 28 6 In essence, the dissent observed that a plaintiff
may abrogate the insurance company's attorney-client privilege simply by
raising a bad faith claim on any matter regarding an interpretation of the
law. 28 7
The Arizona Court of Appeals in Mendoza arguably confirmed the fears
of the dissent in Lee by interpreting and extending the decision in Lee in such
a manner as to effectively institute a per se waiver where the insurer defends
281 Lorenz v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 815 F.2d 1095, 1098 (7th Cir. 1987).
282 Id. (reversing lower court's holding that insurer had waived the privilege by arguing that it
acted in good faith during settlement negotiations, where insurer had merely denied and
refuted allegation of bad faith failure to settle).
283 See Nielsen, supra note 35, at 10.
284 See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 748 P.2d 283, 290
(Wyo. 1987) (holding that where plaintiffs in defamation action alleged that defendants acted
with malice, defendants did not waive privilege by asserting their lack of knowledge as a
defense: "When, as in this case, malice is an element of a liable action, the burden of pleading
and proving that element rests on the plaintiff. Consequently, malice became an issue in this
case when appellants filed their complaint.") (citation omitted).
285 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1179.
286 See Id. at 1187 (McGregor, J., dissenting).
287 See Id. at 1185 (Martone, J., dissenting).
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on the basis of subjective reasonableness. 288 Now, the recent decision of the
Arizona Court of Appeals in Everest appears to stem the tide to a certain
degree. When viewed against decisions from court in Delaware, Ohio,
Washington and Idaho, the development of the Arizona decisions in Lee,
Mendoza, and Everest highlight the ongoing uncertainty that exists regarding
the attorney-client relationship in insurance bad faith cases; these cases
propagate uncertainty for insurance companies relative to seeking needed
legal advice because they cannot assume the advice will remain confidential.
However, the battle lines have been drawn.
The continued expansion of implied waiver would have a chilling effect
upon the attorney-client relationship between insurance companies and their
outside counsel. Certainly there is a chill in the air with the decision from
Delaware, Ohio, Washington and Idaho. The question remains as to whether
Everest is signaling that a thaw is coming to the winter that has been
creeping into the insurance landscape across the country.
288 See Mendoza, 213 P.3d at 303-04.
